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This thesis seeks to analyze the Syrian diaspora’s political mobilization emerging in the United 
States and the United Kingdom after the inception of the 2011 uprising. Despite extensive 
mobilization, the diaspora has been unable to exert influence on host state policies. Providing 
an original look at diaspora politics, this thesis employs social movement impact theory in an 
effort to answer an often-neglected question in diaspora and social movement research: why 
movements fail. The thesis attempts to cover this research gap by answering the following 
research question: Why has the Syrian diaspora failed to influence host state policies in the 
United States and the United Kingdom? 
The thesis makes three separate sets of theoretical propositions based on the works of other 
social movement scholars. One emphasizes internal factors, such as mobilization structures, 
while the remaining two emphasize external factors, such as national political context and 
discursive opportunities respectively. To evaluate these propositions, the thesis engages in the 
strategy of paired comparison and utilizes primary data gathered through fieldwork conducted 
in both case countries and secondary source material.  
The findings suggest that there is no “magic bullet” when it comes to explaining failure to 
impact host state policies. Both internal and external factors offer convincing narratives of the 
diaspora’s lack of impact. In terms of internal factors, both cases reflect two different 
trajectories. In the US, the Syrian diaspora’s uncoordinated and fractionalized mobilization 
limited its influence. In the UK, the diaspora was better coordinated, but lacked a strong lobby 
needed to achieve influence. Furthermore, the analysis indicates that external factors, such as 
shifting policy alignment, divided elites, insufficiently influential allies, unfavorable public 
opinion, and lack of discursive opportunities, had constraining effects on the diaspora’s ability 
to influence policies. 
The thesis demonstrates the need to consider both internal and external factors when studying 
movement outcomes. It shows the utility of studying how movements fail and how social 
movement theory can be incorporated into diaspora politics.   
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In March and April of 2011, a wave of contentious mobilization erupted. The tranquility of 
regular days evolved into disruptive and loud protests, demanding that freedom, pluralism and 
democracy replace the authoritarian regime that indisputably had held the reins of power for 
more than four decades. Displays of placards requesting that Bashar al-Assad step down as 
President were accompanied by countless Syrian flags and chants that rang the streets and 
nearby neighborhoods. Disguised as ordinary people, members of the security establishment 
covertly captured photographs as evidence of the demonstrations to document what they 
perceived as illegitimate challenges to authorities. Later, these photographs would be used as 
tools of repression in order to intimidate and threaten the protestors and their relatives to never 
again cross the regime. 
Yet, the effect of scare tactics was limited; with each attempt to shut down the non-violent 
protests, the activists became more motivated to continue. As the demonstrators carried on with 
their peaceful activities, they found their numbers increasing exponentially with each anti-
regime rally. These numbers included young and old, men and women, Muslim and Christian, 
Alawi and Kurd, who together mobilized in support and solidarity with the Syrian revolution. 
Coordinated through an unprecedented surge of new organizations, the mobilization that 
occurred was adamant to affect and change the political status quo.  
If you had guessed that this short excerpt was from the early protests of the Syrian revolution1 
in cities like Aleppo, Damascus, Deraa, Hama or Homs, you would most certainly have been 
right. Such events and similar response from the security apparatus were typical for the early 
stages of the anti-regime mobilization. However, the actual stage where this particular story 
took place was in Washington, D.C. in the United States. The wave of protests that emerged in 
Syria had also encouraged the expatriate community all around the world to mobilize against 
the Assad-regime and his inner circles. As such, the natural target for these mobs were the 
Syrian delegations and their embassies. Until their closures in 2012 and 2014, the Syrian 
embassies in both the United States and the United Kingdom were central points for mostly 
peaceful, but assertive, and direct political mobilization. After the expulsion of the foreign 
missions, the most frequent target for mobilization changed to host state policy-makers. 
                                                          
1 I will use revolution, uprising, crisis and civil war as terms to cover different aspects of the situation that 
developed in Syria in 2011. I do not treat them as synonymous, but rather as expressions of the precarious 
conflict in Syria. 
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Amongst the expatriates, the United States and the United Kingdom are believed to hold the 
key to a solution to the political and humanitarian crisis in Syria.  
1.1 Research puzzle and question 
The diaspora2 has since the beginning of the uprising been able to sustain such contentious 
activities as those mentioned above while concurrently developing professional advocacy 
organizations. As a social movement, the Syrian diaspora has gone to great lengths in their 
efforts to influence the developments in their homeland and convince host states to support their 
cause. Mobilizing mass demonstrations, organizing conferences, issuing press releases, and 
lobbying policy-makers are only some of the political activities the diaspora has been engaging 
in since 2011.  
Yet, the political mobilization of the Syrian diaspora has, to a large extent, been unsuccessful. 
For example, they have not been able to pressure US or UK governments to: (1) facilitate the 
ousting of the Assad-regime, (2) arming moderate rebels to fight the Assad-regime, (3) 
guarantee civilian protection, (4) humanitarian intervention, (5) remove obstacles hindering 
money transfer, or, (6) substantially increase refugee resettlement rates.3 These points have all 
been advocated for by various Syrian diaspora organizations and been mobilized for through 
contentious activities.4  
Even within the diaspora itself, there are doubts about the value and achievements of political 
mobilization. One member of the Syrian diaspora maintained that the organized efforts to sway 
policies, both domestic and foreign, have so far been fruitless. While discussing the extensive 
mobilization by Syrians in Washington, D.C. he argued: “Not a lot of them are doing any 
meaningful work, in my humble opinion” (Informant 2, 2015). Another who had distanced 
herself from the political mobilization of the diaspora explained her disengagement with this 
argument: “It’s not gonna mean anything. Doing advocacy isn’t going to do any damn thing” 
(Informant 5, 2015).  
                                                          
2 In this thesis, I am analyzing the anti-regime diaspora. For reasons concerning data collection, I do not include 
the pro-regime tenets in the communal groups under study. Furthermore, I do not seek to cover the Syrian 
opposition in its entirety.  
3 Both the US and the UK have increased pledges and resettlement rates since the growth of the refugee crisis. 
The numbers are however small in comparison to for example Sweden and Germany.  




In Britain, a leading figure in one of the established political organization frowned when asked 
what had come of their persistent political engagement over the course of the conflict. She 
argued it was a depressing question and concluded “Unfortunately, [there are] no direct 
achievements in policy […] I think the main issue across the board is that the Syrian voice is 
not being listened to” (Informant 13, 2016).  
In her powerful statement at the humanitarian aid conference organized in London early 2016, 
the activist Rouba Mhaissen urged the international community to include Syrians in 
development strategies and processes of aid implementation: “Speak to us, please; not only 
about us. Don’t speak only in our names” (Sawa for Development & Aid 2016). Supporting her 
argument, a coalition of Syrian civil society organizations issued a statement criticizing the 
underrepresentation of Syrians at the conference. They also added that the opportunities for 
policy recommendations were strictly limited and that important and complex questions were 
not sufficiently debated with Syrian diaspora organizations (Rethink Rebuild Society 2016b). 
The lack of policy achievements through political mobilization and the limited inclusion in 
political processes testaments to the Syrian diaspora’s lack of political influence in the United 
States and the United Kingdom.  
On the other hand, theory on diaspora politics often points to policy achievements and effects 
of diaspora mobilization in contemporary politics. Scholars have for example frequently 
pointed out that diasporas tend to significantly impact homeland and host state politics through 
organizing social movements and advocacy groups (Huntington 1997; Ambrosio 2002; Lyons 
and Mandaville 2012). This is because of their unique position at the nexus of homeland and 
host state and the vast beneficial developments instigated by increased globalization. Ample 
attention has therefore been devoted to questions of effects and outcomes of diaspora 
mobilization, emphasizing in particular their political importance in a variety of cases 
(Vertovec 2005).  
Walt and Mearsheimer (2007), for example, have argued that the Israeli lobby exerts strong 
influence on American foreign policy-making. They argue that it is one of the single most 
powerful mobilized interests in the country. Furthermore, Vanderbush (2014) has demonstrated 
how the Iraqi-diaspora was able to convince, not only the public, but also members of Congress 
that ousting Saddam Hussein were in America’s interests. While not being instrumental in the 
decision to intervene in Kosovo in 1998, the Kosovar-Albanian diaspora in the UK exerted 
some influence on both policy-makers and the public by providing them with extensive 
evidence of the crisis (Koinova 2013, 445–46). Much of this strand of research has thus 
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specifically revolved around host state policy-making and how diasporas functions as ethnic or 
diasporic lobbies with substantial political clout or at least some degree of influence. Indeed, 
the studies of diaspora mobilization have tended to accentuate cases where diasporas to some 
extent has been able to successfully shape host state policies.  
Arguably, the aforementioned research has done so without paying sufficient attention to cases 
where diasporas fail to affect host countries, in other words, the negative cases.5 With few 
exceptions,6 diaspora research has almost taken for granted that diaspora groups affect both 
processes and outcomes in contemporary politics, given a convergence of interests is present 
(Østergaard-Nielsen 2006). At the very least, they have deemed interesting only the cases where 
diasporas do have an impact and largely neglected those in which no effect can be observed. It 
might therefore seem puzzling why the Syrian diaspora, even according to themselves, has not 
been able to influence host state politics despite extensive mobilization and some extent of 
mutual interests between mobilizers and targets. The research question of this thesis builds upon 
this puzzle. By employing concepts and tools developed in social movement theory, I intend to 
answer the following research question: 
Why has the Syrian diaspora failed to influence7 host state policies in the United States and the 
United Kingdom?  
1.2 Why is this research important? 
I argue that this research is important for a number of reasons. For one, diasporas are important. 
While it was often stated that studies of diasporas were confined to a limited number of “classic” 
cases, such as the Jewish or Armenian diasporas, this is no longer true. There now exists a wide 
range of studies that covers an extensive array of cases. Furthermore, crucial theoretical 
developments have been made on the topics of diaspora formation, diaspora identities, diaspora 
political mobilization and diaspora impact in conflict situations. With other words, the 
increasingly acknowledged global influence of such groups among both academics and policy-
makers is a strong indicator of the growing importance of diaspora politics in general (Vertovec 
2005; Adamson 2016). Globalization and the development of new communication technologies 
are oft-cited reasons for why diasporas are more significant now compared to several decades 
                                                          
5 Cases that are still relevant, but have negative dependent variables (see chapter 4). 
6 The study of the Ethiopian and Haitian diasporas in the US by Lyons (2014) and Erikson (2014) respectively. 
7 I will use lack of impact, influence and outcome interchangeably throughout the rest of the thesis to allow for 




ago (Sheffer 1995; Adamson 2005). This is unlikely to change in the near future. It is thus 
important to continue devoting research to diaspora politics, of which this thesis intend to do. 
Second, an important rationale for this research is that it aims to demonstrate the usefulness of 
combining social movement impact theory and diaspora politics. By treating the extensive 
mobilization by the Syrian diaspora in the US and the UK as forms of social movements, we 
can generate knowledge on the question of why mobilized diasporas fail in their quest of 
political influence. As I shall return to in the theory chapter (chapter 2), other researchers have 
also suggested to connect these two otherwise separated fields of study. Unique in this thesis is 
that it aims use social movement theories to explain impact – or rather the lack of it – instead 
of using it to explain how they are formed as others have done (Sökefeld 2006; Adamson 2012). 
Yet, I do not see my contribution in contradiction to these important works, but rather as an 
extension or another piece in the larger puzzle concerning diasporas. 
Third, I approach an unorthodox element of social movement theory – lack of impact. It was 
claimed in the 1990s that questions of impact more broadly had received only scant attention 
by social scientists (Giugni 1998). While this is no longer true, there is still a substantial caveat 
in much of the recently emerged research on movement impact that it predominantly focus on 
cases of movement impact. Little attention has been devoted to the question of why movements 
fail to impact decision-makers. Furthermore, none have tried to ask specifically why diasporas 
fail to impact policies, to my knowledge. A probable explanation for this shortcoming in social 
movement impact studies lies in its inherently challenging undertaking. Nonetheless, by 
scrutinizing those cases where we can observe mobilization, but no apparent policy impact, we 
can increase the robustness of our existing findings. Alternatively, we can correct misgivings 
in our current theoretical developments. Thus, I see this thesis as an important building block 
in our endeavors to properly understand why movements, and in particular diaspora 
movements, fail to impact host state policies. It is an ambitious enterprise that I hope can 
supplement existing literature on social movement impact and diaspora politics.  
Lastly, I intend to shed light on a largely understudied empirical case, the Syrian diaspora. It 
was noted not long ago, in an attempt to demystify Syria, that the Middle Eastern country 
remains poorly understood (Lawson 2012). So too does the Syrian diaspora. This might not 
seem all that surprising considering that the Syrian diaspora is still very much in the making, 
and, as we shall see, largely been nonexistent as a community prior to the Syrian uprising. 
Along with only a handful of recent studies (Jörum 2015; Moss 2016; Baeza and Pinto 2016), 
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this thesis also has an empirical imperative; to shed light on an understudied case of diaspora 
mobilization that is both recent and still ongoing.  
1.3 Findings of the thesis 
My findings indicate first and foremost that the Syrian diaspora’s failure to influence host state 
policies in the United States and the United Kingdom is due to a composite and complex set of 
factors. While one of the most debated aspects in movement impact theory revolves around the 
question of whether internal or external explanations best account for the outcome, my 
empirical evidence suggests that we need to revisit this more apparent than real division (Giugni 
1999). There is no “magic bullet” that determines movement outcomes. Both internal and 
external aspects jointly tells the story. We must therefore be careful in our assessments and 
conclusions of what explains both movement influence and the absence of it. 
Furthermore, by utilizing the strategy of paired comparison, this thesis has found that the Syrian 
diaspora in the US and the UK reflect two different movement trajectories with respect to 
internal factors. In the Syrian-American community, conservative connections and ties to the 
regime amongst the diaspora’s “early risers” functioned as a constraint on the ability to garner 
widespread support within the community. Reflected in the plethora of different communal 
SMOs established in the wake of the Syrian uprising in 2011 is the ethnic and sectarian 
cleavages that have existed in Syria (and in the diaspora) for a long period of time. With the 
uprising, these elements became manifested through an uncoordinated and fractionalized Syrian 
mobilization. Strengthening the element of fractionalization was the role of personal agendas 
and elite rivalries. Ambitious “one-man shows” and competition for attention furthered 
cleavages. In turn, these elements have made it difficult for policy-makers to know who to listen 
to in the diaspora and who serves as a legitimate representative of the expatriate community 
and Syrians more broadly. It has thus reduced the diaspora’s political influence. 
In the Syrian-British community, the limited size and funding have produced constraints on the 
diaspora’s ability to fund organized political activities. In addition, its strong focus on internal 
solidarity and cohesion have produced a weak political lobby, serving as a substantial constraint 
on its ability to promote the diaspora’s interests in London. While being able to coordinate their 
efforts better than its Syrian-American counterparts, the aforementioned factors have also made 
its expression less professionalized and more “activisty”. As such, it has developed a 




able to exert influence on Britain’s Syria-policy because of its weak lobby has thus been better 
suited at affecting perceptions of the conflict rather than influencing policies. 
Despite different trajectories, my findings do identify one shared element. Namely the lack of 
civil society experience in Syria. The effect of repression from abroad, limited 
acknowledgement of differences in education, and subsequently low levels of trust prevented 
the diaspora from mobilizing prior to the revolution. This has particularly had a strong effect 
on the development of cleavages in the Syrian-American community, but also made the process 
of diaspora construction difficult in the Syrian-British community. 
My findings also illustrate how a variety of commonly employed contextual variables presents 
opportunities and constraints. The empirical evidence reflects similar challenges in the political 
processes for both the Syrian-American and the Syrian-British diaspora. While both diaspora’s 
have had access to respective systems, they have faced substantial constraints on the remaining 
indicators. A shifting policy alignment produced reduced the level of interest convergence and 
thus constrained the diaspora’s ability to influence host state policies. Both diasporas had 
notable political allies, but as argued, they were not influential enough. Furthermore, there is 
evidence of partisan splits on both sides of the Atlantic. The partisan rivalry have prevented 
consensus on the Syrian issue which has limited the diaspora’s room for influence. While public 
opinion have largely been aligned opposite to the diaspora, the evidence presented have some 
validity issues. Keeping this in mind, the thesis find that public opinion has been unfavorable 
and thus a constraint on the diaspora’s ability to influence respective host states. 
The last element of this thesis shows that the political discourse of non-intervention has been a 
crucial component, limiting the diaspora’s ability to frame the Syria crisis as similar to Kosovo 
in 1998 or Libya in 2011. Extensive war fatigue is part of this explanation. Furthermore, the 
rise of terrorist organizations, such as Jabhat al-Nusra and Daesh,8 has moved the discourse 
into one dominantly about anti-terrorism. One that constrains the diaspora’s ability to frame 
what they argue is the root cause of the problem, the Assad-regime.   
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
In the next chapter (2), I will go through the theoretical framework and the concepts that, 
together, constitutes the spine of the thesis. It includes a short discussion of the concept of 
                                                          
8 Daesh (al-Dawlah al-Islamīyah fī al-ʻIrāq wa-al-Shām) is an Arabic acronym for the Islamic State of Iraq and 
Syria (ISIS) who control large areas in Northern and Eastern Syria.  
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diaspora to illustrate how the Syrian expatriate community applies. Furthermore, I present a 
literature review on social movement theory and carefully conceptualize social movement 
impact. The last section of this chapter is the analytical framework and illustrates how I intend 
to analyze the two cases of diaspora mobilization. I separate between internal and external 
variables in an effort to follow conventional research on social movement impact as well as to 
isolate organizational and contextual variables. For each of these components, I will present 
sets of questions that, based on theoretical arguments, opens up for a number of possible 
explanations to why the diaspora has failed to impact host state policies.  
In chapter 3, I will elaborate on the research design, covering methodological considerations 
and challenges, choice of strategy (paired comparison) and the process of data collection. The 
limits of the study will permeate through this chapter in an effort to provide for transparency. 
In chapter 4, I contextualize the thesis by providing a brief summary of Syrian migratory history 
and politics. I do not intend to detail any of these aspects, but rather try to put the Syrian diaspora 
in perspective. This means that I provide a short introduction to the political developments in 
Syria, presenting a timeline from just before the revolution to present time. 
In chapter 5, I present a narrative of the diaspora’s political mobilization and identify their 
mobilization goals. I then move on to answer the questions set out in the theory chapter by 
alternating between the two cases of diaspora mobilization as I cover first internal and then 
external explanations.  
Concluding, in chapter 6, the main findings of the thesis will be covered and discussed with 
respect to its theoretical implications. I also point to the consequences of failing to impact host 






2 Theory and Concepts: Diaspora 
Mobilization and Social Movement 
Theory 
2.1 Introduction 
In general terms, the fundamental goal of science is to “[…] discover new things about the 
world and to appraise the truth-value of extant propositions about the world” (Gerring 2012, 
27). This means, firstly, that any given research project is aimed towards generating new 
knowledge that feeds back to the sciences (in this case, the social sciences), and secondly, that 
it critically evaluates existing literature and its claims on how reality looks like. This project is 
no different in this respect. To assess and explain diaspora impact on host state politics (or the 
lack thereof), presenting an overview of central concepts and the development of them is 
required. Scholars have also pointed out that this is central in order to identify the contribution 
of one’s research (George and Bennett 2005, 70).  
Consequently, this particular chapter will attempt to shed light on the theoretical framework on 
which the empirical analysis is based. As such, the chapter is divided into three separate parts. 
In the first part, I conceptualize diaspora, account for the main tenets of academic discourse on 
the phenomena, and briefly situate the Syrian expatriate community in the two countries as a 
case of it.9 To affect home state policies, the community must channel its interest as a somewhat 
coherent social force – a diaspora. The diasporic collective identity is a necessary component 
for political mobilization. Secondly, I turn briefly to diasporas and national political 
mobilization. Thirdly, social movement theory will serve as a theoretical bridge, linking 
diaspora engagement during conflict, with the fundamental research question of impact. This 
includes a review of previous and current theories on social movements – how they arise and 
how they matter in politics. By proposing reasons for the lack of political influence, I will 
highlight which variables are of theoretical significance in this particular case, as suggested by 
George and Bennett (2005, 69).  
                                                          
9 I cover this aspect more in-depth in chapter 4.  
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2.2 The development of diaspora studies 
The study of diaspora entered the research agenda of the social sciences in the mid-1970s and 
proliferated exponentially in the 1980s (Brubaker 2005, 1). Since then, scholars from a variety 
of academic disciplines have devoted more and more attention to the concept as it developed in 
tandem with an increasingly more globalized and transnational world. Most can agree that “[…] 
diaspora has to do with dislocation, with having left particular places and living elsewhere, or 
with simply being ‘out of place’” (Sökefeld 2006, 265). Nevertheless, an unfortunate tendency 
has been that “diaspora”, much due to its multidisciplinary features, has been used with little 
agreement on theoretical conceptualization in contemporary academic discourse. It is even 
sometimes used interchangeably with transnationalism, which reflects a different intellectual 
genealogy (Bauböck and Faist 2010, 9).  
For the purposes of this thesis, I think it is paramount to make an effort to bring clarity to the 
concept. The reason for this is twofold. Firstly, designating Syrians mobilizing abroad as a case 
of diaspora mobilization requires empirical justification, rooted in theorized conceptualization. 
Secondly, as has been noted by some scholars, the development of diasporas and the manner of 
which they engage in national politics resemble processes of social movement emergence and 
politicization (Sökefeld 2006; Sökefeld 2008; Adamson 2012). While they tend to emphasize 
diasporas as transnational identity communities (which they certainly are), I stress the 
contextual boundedness of the Syrian diaspora within the United States and the United 
Kingdom. Their mobilization efforts have been largely focused on producing favorable political 
outcomes through national political processes. In dealing with the theoretical aspects of 
diasporas, I briefly touch upon the essentialist and constructivist debate, and how the Syrian 
diaspora conforms with a necessary and sufficient conceptualization of the term.  
The essentialist currents of diaspora theory perceive diasporas as emerging generally through 
the process of migration across national borders. Originally, the concept was based almost 
exclusively on its historical origins. With roots in the paradigmatic case of the Jews, the 
classical perspective regarded diasporas as a social entity emerging through a process of 
victimization and subsequent dispersion or migratory processes (Sheffer 2003, 9). The actual 
word literally means “dispersion” or “to sow over or scatter” in Greek and is, perhaps, the most 
widely recognized feature of diasporas today.  
The very identity of Jews and similar social groups was fundamentally based on a cataclysmic 




exile, oppression and moral degradation served as a strong constitutive factor for the 
development of a collective consciousness for the Jews (Safran 1991, 83). As such, succinct 
designation of diasporas conformed with the idea of grievances developed through experiences 
of victimization. African Americans and Armenians have been treated as diasporas based on 
this and similar criteria (Shepperson 1966; Tölölyan 2002). Other scholars of the essentialist 
current have downplayed the need for a traumatizing experience. Some maintain that migration 
in search for labor (Weiner 1986) or trading opportunities (Fallers 1962; Curtin 1984) also 
develop diaspora communities. If we extend the concept of diaspora to include these elements, 
the Mexican diaspora in the United States and the Chinese diaspora in most corners of the world 
are notable examples.  
The most fundamental critique of the essentialist strand of diaspora theory came from social 
constructivists (Sökefeld 2006; Sökefeld 2008; Adamson 2012). While retaining the need for 
migration and dispersion, this alone was not a sufficient condition qualifying migrants as 
diaspora. Indeed, social constructivists claimed that diasporas had to be politically and socially 
mobilized by strategic actors. Such mobilization would reify identity and loyalty towards the 
homeland and thus develop a distinctive community within the national context of the host 
state. The in-between experience of these organized migrants resembled the idea of “imagined 
communities” (Anderson 1983). While it is empirically difficult to assess imaginary bonds to 
the homeland, some scholars maintain it is possible to observe such identities through analyzing 
discourse (Sökefeld 2006). By taking note of established diasporic organizations and examining 
their activities and intentions, such social constructions become clear. The cases under study 
here reveals explicit political identities based on a combination of Syrian heritage and criticism 
towards the existing regime. As noted by Adamson (2012), such political identity can be used 
by diaspora groups as a source of empowerment. In this way, diasporas are both the result of 
social and political mobilization, and important devices for mobilizing for political purposes.   
I employ Brubaker’s (2005) notion of a diaspora which, to a certain extent, reflects consensus 
in the literature. Conceptualizing diaspora through the logic of necessary and sufficient 
conditions suggests that if one of the three following indicators are absent, the empirical 
phenomenon being studied is correspondingly absent (Goertz 2005). The indicators that are 
necessary and sufficient conditions to consider a minority community a diaspora are: 
(1) Dispersion 




In my view, these three indicators are indispensable to qualify a group as a diaspora in any 
meaningful sense of the word. It limits inclusivity and avoids extensive conceptual stretching 
(Sartori 1970). As such, I retain a conceptualization that allows for conceptual travelling the 
application of the concept on new cases (D. Collier and Mahon 1993). Dispersion follows what 
has been previously stated and includes some form of migration. Homeland orientation is based 
on the notion of the homeland as a dominant source of value, identity and loyalty. The 
orientation can, as several scholars have stated, reflect a real or imagined homeland11 (Safran 
1991; Tölölyan 1996; Baser and Swain 2008). Lastly, boundary-maintenance is a condition that 
accounts for the preservation of an identity separate from the host country. This can be the result 
of resistance to assimilation or the inability to properly integrate in the new society. Boundary-
maintenance has also served as an important element in sustaining collective identities in social 
movements (Taylor and Whittier 1992; Melucci 1996; Polletta and Jasper 2001). These 
necessary and sufficient conditions qualify the Syrian expatriate community as a diaspora in 
both the United States and the United Kingdom, but only after 2011. I will cover this more 
extensively in the background chapter (4). I now turn to political mobilization of diasporas.  
2.2.1 Diasporas and national political mobilization 
It has been claimed that diasporas should be treated as significant political actors in modern 
political analysis because they tend to serve as an important linkage between host state and 
homeland politics (Hall, Kostic, and Swain 2007, 9). Proliferation of communication tools and 
enhanced transportation has served to facilitate close ties between diasporas and homeland 
communities, making them particularly vital during conflict situations. The impetus for 
studying diasporas as political actors was predominantly based on a notion that their activities 
had been overlooked by scholars of conflict and contentious politics (Smith 2007). This is no 
longer the case. 
Today, there is an impressive body of literature that study diasporas as political actors in 
international relations and political science. Much of which revolves around the question of 
                                                          
10 Boundaries and maintaining them have been noted to be of particular importance for diasporas engaged in the 
political sphere (Sheffer 2003, 11). It should also be mentioned that the boundaries overlaps with a wider 
network of Arabs and Muslims. This thesis focuses however exclusively on those who render themselves 
specifically Syrian.  




whether they facilitate peace-building and alleviate the hardship of war (Newland and Patrick 
2004; Spear 2006; Fagen and Bump 2006; Cochrane 2007; Hall and Swain 2007; Baser and 
Swain 2008; Mohamoud and Osman 2008), or impede peace processes by sustaining conflict 
(Bruinessen 1998; Lorton 2000; Byman et al. 2001; Hockenos 2003; P. Collier and Hoeffler 
2004).  
Diasporas are then perceived as operating on the transnational level, transcending national 
boundaries and mobilizing at the venues that are most promising at a given time, be it the US 
Congress or the United Nations (Lyons 2014). While the above is true in most cases, including 
the Syrian diaspora, it often blurs the distinction between mobilization claims at the national 
and international levels. Furthermore, focusing on transnational mobilization makes it difficult 
to explore the particular interactions between the diaspora and the host state at the national 
level. As impact on national policy is of interest here, I thus emphasize the national level of 
diaspora engagement principally.  
It is also important to stress that diasporas rarely are homogenous entities. By that I mean that 
diasporas rarely act as one in politics (Vertovec 2005). There are, for example, often multiple 
and often competing conceptions of the homeland within one and the same diaspora (Bush 
2007, 18). This is also the same for social movements, to which I now turn. 
2.3 Social movement theory – connecting diasporas 
 and social movements 
The plethora of academic work on diasporas from various scholarly disciplines have rarely, if 
at all, connected with social movement theory. The most notable exceptions are Eccarius-Kelly 
(2002), Adamson (Adamson 2005; Adamson 2013), Koinova (2011; Koinova 2013), Jörum 
(2015) and Amarasingam (2015). This might come as a surprise as diasporas are, on the one 
hand, the result and visible evidence of a social mobilization process, and on the other, 
continuously pursue their interests and issue their claims towards politicians and others deemed 
important in their everyday activities. As Adamson contends, diasporas are inherently social 
constructs – “[…] one can hypothesize that they are constructed by political entrepreneurs who 
are acting rationally and strategically through the strategic deployment of identity frames and 
categories” (2012, 32). This perspective establishes that the toolkit developed by the social 
movement literature can prove useful in understanding diasporas as being the outcome of 
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strategically determined mobilization projects. Such community organizations, fundamentally 
based on shared identities, are not simply a natural consequence of migration.  
One, if not the single most important contribution in this respect, is Sökefeld’s works that focus 
primarily on critiquing the essentialist approach in diaspora theory. He claims that the collective 
identity on which such groups are based, are in essence initiated, sustained and 
constrained/obstructed by similar processes as is experienced by social movements (Sökefeld 
2006; Sökefeld 2008). Political opportunities and constraints, mobilization structures and 
practices, and framing of issues are all useful concepts for understanding the intricate process 
of identification and materialization of a diaspora, and how they may or may not affect host 
state policies. Additionally, I will add that this theoretical framework is useful for understanding 
the concurrent interest claims on the national and international level regarding the homeland 
crisis in the instance of the Syrian diaspora.  
Thus far, I hope to have made the case for incorporating diaspora into the social movement 
literature. The following sub-chapters will attempt to delve into the highly contested mire of 
social movement studies, and assess independent variables suitable to explain why the Syrian 
diaspora in the United States and the United Kingdom have lacked impact on the respective 
countries’ politics. These sections will also deal with the discourse and the more general 
disciplinary developments of social movement theory. By using established ideas from the 
synthesized political process approach12 (PPA) that includes political opportunities, 
mobilization structures and framing processes (e.g. McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996), I seek 
to explore theoretical propositions that can possibly explain the absence of political impact in 
the context of diaspora mobilization. The propositions I refine for the purposes of this thesis 
are principally divided into two, distinguishing between internal and external explanations. 
This dichotomy determines whether the effect on propensity for impact are endogenous or 
exogenous to the movement. One can think of internal explanations as closely related to 
mobilization structures, whereas external explanations encompasses both political 
opportunities/constraints and framing processes. A further elaboration on this distinction will 
follow subsequently. I now turn to the topic of social movement definition.  
                                                          
12 I acknowledge the existence of more recent theories on social movements, such as the dynamic approach that 
emphasize interaction contexts, mechanisms and processes in contentious politics (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 
2001; Tarrow and Tilly 2006) and the strategic approach that highlights actors’ dilemmas and choices in 
particular political contexts (Jasper 2006; Fligstein and McAdam 2011). The choice of focusing narrowly on the 
political process approach serves to limit the scope of the analysis and allows for the usage of rigidly 
conceptualized and established indicators. Furthermore, it allows for systematic theoretical exploration of 




2.3.1 Social movements defined  
Social movements are fundamentally about the development of collective action, intended on 
producing some kind of political and/or social change. It has traditionally been regarded first 
and foremost as cases of grassroots or more generally as “bottom-up” mobilization, but recent 
contributions – and the previous paragraph – allude to strategic choices made by social 
movement entrepreneurs or key actors (Jasper 2004; Jasper 2006). There exists a wide range of 
definitions, some compatible and, perhaps an equal number, incompatible, with respect to 
details on movements’ actions and targets. What is crucial for this thesis is to ensure that the 
wide range of political, social, economic and cultural activities in the diaspora is covered, while 
simultaneously retaining some degree of conceptual rigidity. 
 By considering these prerequisites, Tarrow's definition of social movements seems fruitful: 
“[S]ocial movements are […] defined as collective challenges, based on common purposes and 
social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities” (Tarrow 
2011, 9). Essential here is the emphasis on common purposes and social solidarities – these are 
main building blocks for social movements in general, but perhaps for diaspora mobilization in 
particular. In the case of the Syrian diaspora, a sense of common purpose and solidarity with 
“Syrian brethren” both abroad and at home has been indispensable for mobilization to take 
place.  
I also maintain that the diaspora movements under study in this thesis employ a wide range of 
tools to advance their claims towards policy-makers. While the traditional literature on social 
movements tend to emphasize protest activities as a functional definition of social movements, 
more recent accounts accept the notion of more organized means of influence such as lobbyism 
(Diani 1992; Taylor and Van Dyke 2004; della Porta and Diani 2006). This definition of social 
movements13 thus capture the extensive activities the Syrian diaspora engages in without 
limiting its collective action repertoire to traditional extra-institutional means (Gamson and 
Meyer 1996, 283) or actions otherwise considered to be outside organizational channels of 
influence (Snow, Soule, and Kriesi 2004, 11). As will be discussed in the empirical chapter 
(chapter 6), the Syrian diaspora has used a wide range of tools from the contentious toolbox, 
among them, direct lobbyism. These are various strategic approaches social movements have 
at their disposal when engaging with policy processes.  
                                                          
13 We are close to engage in conceptual stretching, but this choice is legitimate based on the work of the 
aforementioned researchers.  
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2.3.2 Grievance and irrational collective behavior 
The study of social movements evolved primarily as a critique of the grievance literature that 
stipulated that grassroots uprisings and mass mobilizations emerged as a result of social 
atomization (Kornhauser 1959), relative deprivation (Gurr 1970), or “disturbed states of mind” 
as stated by McAdam in his review of this this strand of thought (1982, 7). In this literature, the 
vast expansion of popular movements and their threat to the political status quo was a causally 
developed consequence of personal frustration (Klandermans 1984). Structural strain, it was 
maintained, produced widespread socio-psychological dissonance, which in turn produced 
irrational motivation for people to challenge powerholders in the form of social movements.  
However, the references to these kinds of social mobilizations can be traced back to some of 
the most influential classics on the matter of collective action, namely Marx (1983), who in a 
similar fashion understood the grievances of the working class as sufficient for collective 
mobilization of the proletariat against the capitalists. Yet, this ignored vital questions regarding 
the mobilization process, and as Tarrow points out, underrated the requirements of sufficient 
resources, the cultural dimensions of mobilization, and, perhaps most fundamentally, politics 
(Tarrow 2011, 17). How would this mobilization take form and be sustained, i.e. how would 
mobilizers overcome what Olson (1965) coined the “collective action paradox” where, in the 
absence of any real sanction or benefit, collective action would be nearly impossible? 
Additionally, the amount of cases where strain has not led to any form of social mobilization is 
ample. “Social insurgency is only an occasional phenomenon […]” (McAdam 1982, 11). This 
critique was the stimulus of an immense development of the social movement studies.  
2.3.3 Resource mobilization 
A turn in the literature was the marked emphasis on availability of resources for mobilization 
to take place. It emerged, on the one hand, as a challenge to the conception of movements as 
simply a result of frustration, and on the other, as a challenge to the partly erroneous logic 
presented by Olson. There had to be an issue with the assumptions in the paradox of collective 
action as the 1960-70s witnessed a surge of so-called New Social Movements (NSM). 
Demonstrations arose and included individuals with no particular prospect for gain or loss in it. 
The argument was that by being in possession of resources, both material and immaterial, 




and a sustained relationship with notable actors (e.g. media or authorities) are respective 
examples (Oberschall 1973; McCarthy and Zald 1977).  
The argument also claimed that organization was crucial (Gamson 1990). The movement more 
effectively materialized through the establishment of a relatively rigid and more 
professionalized Social Movement Organization (SMO). Such organizations would identify 
goals in accordance with the broader movement’s preferences and consequently pursue them 
politically (McCarthy and Zald 1977, 1218; Zald and McCarthy 1987). It seemed, however, 
that this approach conflated SMOs somewhat with interest groups.14 It overstated the 
organizational aspect of social movements and “[…] the centrality of deliberate strategic 
decisions […]” (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001, 15). Other critics have pointed to culture as 
another missing element in the resource mobilizations approach (Williams 2004).  
For the purpose of this thesis, the development of SMOs have been vital for the Syrian 
diaspora’s ability to sustain their political mobilization and allocate financial resources. I treat 
such organizations as a central element in connecting social networks within the diaspora and 
organize strategic approaches to the political processes in respective host countries. While they 
might call themselves “Syrian advocacy organizations” or “interest groups”, they are here 
considered formalized SMOs. I thus avoid artificially homogenizing the Syrian diaspora. 
Furthermore, it allows us to better understand the internal dynamics of diaspora politics, as 
argued by Bush (2007). As will be discussed in depth below, SMOs have also been a critical 
discussion point in the literature on social movement impact. 
2.3.4 Political process theory 
McAdam (1982) offered, in his proposed framework for analyzing social movements, a macro 
perspective on the development of social movements. This view built largely on Eisinger’s 
(1973) conception of political opportunity structures and Tilly’s (1978) classic on conditions 
for “contentious events” in terms of both opportunity and threats. The basic idea was that social 
movement actors did not materialize in a political vacuum. On the contrary, mobilization was 
a response to opportunities provided by institutional arrangements within the polity. These 
institutional arrangements affected the propensity for the development of any collective action. 
By lowering the costs of collective action, political opportunities triggered social mobilization. 
                                                          
14 For an extensive discussion on the distinction between SMOs, interest groups and other forms of organization 
for interest articulation, see Andrews and Edwards (2004). 
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Such political opportunities functioned as resources external to the movement itself and 
subsequently influenced the choice of strategic approach and which tools to use among the 
repertoire of contention.  
In contrast to the resource mobilization theory, the political process model emphasized political 
and historical factors, or structures, that defined “the rules of the game” (Meyer 2004, 128). 
These rules tended to be particular institutional structures. McAdam maintained that these 
structures of political opportunities (rules) varied greatly over time, which consequently 
accounted for the “ebb and flow” characteristics of movement activity (1982, 40–41). A central 
advantage of the political process model was that it situated social movement activity within an 
institutional framework. It effectively linked collective action and institutionalized politics 
(McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996, 3). Additionally, it combined the organizational aspects 
of social movements, claiming that opportunities would not be seized in the absence of 
sufficient organization. The development of shared understanding of movement cause and 
identity functioned as mediation between structure and organization. The approach proved to 
be popular and was embraced to such an extent that it was rendered “hegemonic” amongst 
scholars of social movements (Goodwin and Jasper 1999, 28).   
Much because of its popularity, considerable effort has been put into defining political 
opportunity structures. For example, in his efforts to explain variation in riot intensity in 
American cities, Eisinger (1973) employed a broad conceptualization. He identified the local 
political opportunity structure as “[…] a function of the degree to which groups are likely to be 
able to gain access to power and to manipulate the political system” (Eisinger 1973, 25). Such 
opportunities were based on the distinction between open and closed features of local 
institutional arrangements. Systems that allowed conventional political input were rendered 
open, whereas those that denied political participation were treated as closed. Eisinger’s 
findings suggested a curvilinear relationship between protest activity and degree of openness. 
Fully open or fully closed structures discouraged such mobilization because disruptive behavior 
would be either preempted or repressed.  
Expanding the conception of political opportunity, Kitschelt (1986) also built on the notion of 
open and closed features of political institutions. Different from Eisinger, he distinguished 
between two dimensions of opportunities: input structures and output structures. Input 
structures mirrored the degree of openness in the political system as pointed out in the previous 
paragraph. Output structures, on the other hand, concerned policy implementation capacity. 




social movements” (Kitschelt 1986, 63). As will be elaborated upon below, Kitschelt’s 
treatment of opportunity structures was also important for the study of social movement impact.  
McAdam et al. noted in 1996 that the opportunity structures had become an increasingly wide 
concept subject to substantial conceptual stretching (Sartori 1970). Various authors employed 
their own conceptualizations of opportunities when the dimensions suggested by others did not 
fit their particular case (D. Collier and Mahon 1993). This prompted Gamson and Meyer’s 
critique that political opportunity structure was in danger of becoming an “all-encompassing 
fudge-factor” covering all facets of the political context (1996, 275). In fact, political 
opportunity structures resembled less a single explanatory variable than a cluster of variables 
(Tarrow 1988, 430).  
As such, Tarrow (2011) offered a synthesis of political opportunities.15 In his theoretical 
contribution on the broader trends of contentious politics and the “social movement sector” 
(Tarrow 1988), he identified a cluster of four indicators that constituted the overall political 
opportunity structure of a particular political context. These indicators sought to explain the 
general emergence of political mobilization and not of particular groups. A perceived change 
on any of the indicators would likely trigger mobilization on a variety of issues. It would provide 
a “window of opportunity” for movements to emerge:  
(1) Increased access to the political system  
(2) Shifting alignments within the political system 
(3) Divided political elites 
(4) Presence of elite allies 
I argue that these indicators are useful for the empirical investigation of the Syrian diaspora’s 
mobilization because they allow for the observation of particular political factors that may have 
reduced their prospects for political impact. As such, they may function as opportunities or 
constraints for the diaspora in each individual host state. I will specify these indicators in section 
2.6.2.  
Despite its popularity, the political process model has also been subject to substantial critique 
(Gamson and Meyer 1996; Goodwin and Jasper 1999; Meyer 2004; Meyer and Minkoff 2004). 
                                                          
15 McAdam (1996a) produced a similar synthesis. It built upon Tarrow’s indicators in addition to those of 
Brockett (1991), Kriesi et al. (1992), and Rucht (1996). It is similar to the one presented here with the exception 
of propensity for repression. This indicator has been excluded because it was not applicable to the paired 
comparison of this thesis. 
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Some of the critique concerned inaccurate conceptualization, as covered above. Others also 
argued that the political process model, and its adherents, over-emphasized structural factors 
and ignored, or at the very least, paid insufficient attention to strategy and agency (Goodwin 
and Jasper 1999, 29). Effectively reducing all factors to questions about structure overlooked 
actors and the interaction between actors, such as that between movement participants and 
targets for mobilization. This and similar dynamics were not part of what they maintained was 
an overly structural and invariant model. In an effort to assess this critique, central scholars of 
the political process model have made attempts at studying dynamics and mechanisms within 
contentious politics (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Tarrow and Tilly 2006).  
Criticism also pointed towards the perspective that opportunity structures proposed to explain 
variation in entire movement cycles. Consequently, Meyer and Minkoff (2004) argued for a 
distinction between structural aspects of opportunities and those that were issue-specific. Issue-
specific opportunities did not apply for all movements. As such, particular opportunity 
indicators such as media coverage and prevailing discourse, and public opinion, encourage 
mobilization for certain collective actors. The expanded notion of opportunity structure allowed 
for the inclusion of non-political features.  
Kriesi’s (2004) effort at refining the political process model included a broader array of 
opportunities including these elements. Whereas this has been critiqued for allowing virtually 
all aspects of the context to be included in analyses of opportunity structures (Goldstone and 
Tilly 2001; Tarrow 2011), I maintain that an expanded notion of opportunity structure is needed 
to answer the research question in this thesis. Overlooking or ignoring certain elements of 
opportunity would risk attributing excessive explanatory power to other variables and thus 
result in a biased or spurious conclusion (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994; Landman 2013). 
While some may be less tangible and harder to observe, the use of various sources of data 
alleviates in part some of this issue. Data triangulation corrects some of the inadequacies and 
errors of observation from only one type of source. I will discuss the elements of opportunity 
that can explain the lack of impact from the Syrian diaspora below, but first a word on framing 
and frame alignment processes. 
2.3.5 Framing and frame alignment processes 
Framing and frame alignment processes emerged within social movement studies as a critique 




structural political process theories. Theories of “framing” or “frame alignment processes”, as 
proposed by Snow and colleagues, attempted to produce a new and better understanding of how 
support and participation in social movements developed (Snow et al. 1986; Snow and Benford 
1988; Snow and Benford 1992; Benford and Snow 2000). The process of framing deals with 
how movements give meaning to and interpret events in order to generate linkages between 
social movement organizations and individuals.  
“Frame” was a concept borrowed from Goffman which denoted a “schemata of interpretation” 
that would enable individuals “to locate, perceive, identify, and label” occurrences within their 
life space and the world at large” (Goffman 1974, 21; Benford and Snow 2000, 614). 
“Framing”, then, means “the conscious, strategic efforts of movement groups too fashion 
meaningful accounts of themselves and the issues at hand in order to motivate and legitimate 
their efforts” (McAdam 1996a, 6). In McAdam’s (1982) analysis of the Civil Rights movement, 
the process of “cognitive liberation” illustrated the importance of a common idea to foster 
mobilization. In this particular case, the movement framed their situation as unjust which, 
subsequently, garnered support and extensive popular mobilization for the cause.  
As with other disciplinary development in social movement theory, frame alignment processes 
have not been without critique. Empirical work on collective action frames have had a tendency 
to place emphasis on statements, writings and speeches at the cost of studying movement 
actions. As such, actions and tactical choices made by social movement actors have been 
downplayed in favor of what McAdam (1996b, 341) calls “the ideational bias”. Resonant ideas 
are often encoded in a group’s activities. It has also been argued that the “cultural turn” in social 
science carries limited value if its corrective to the structural paradigm fails to connect its 
cultural components with the political process.  
By including framing within the broader political context as suggested by some authors (Kriesi 
2004), the cultural aspect can help explain both the emergence and outcome of social 
movements. I argue that discursive elements of political opportunity works as an avenue where 
framing becomes empirically observable. By analyzing the diaspora movements’ framing 
processes against the backdrop of a broader political discourse, we can demonstrate its effect 





2.4 The impact of social movements 
Social movement studies have since their inception been aimed towards uncovering factors that 
are more or less conducive to the rise of popular movements. Less systematic research has been 
conducted on how these mobilizations matter in the polity they arise, and whether they have 
any significant impact or not. Several authors have pointed to this deficiency within the 
literature (Berkowitz 1974; Gurr 1970; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1988; Tarrow 1993). 
This might seem puzzling since questions of if and how much social movements matter is 
important precisely because we assume that they can influence politics and society (Amenta et 
al. 2010, 292). This is not to say that questions related to impact have been disregarded 
completely in earlier publications.  
Gamson’s (1990) widely cited work has been treated as a seminal contribution to the question 
of how and when social movements matter. It has for more than four decades been considered 
the most ambitious effort to analyze social movement impact (Giugni 1999). Even though it 
sparked a rich discussion on the topic, questions of impact have had a firm backseat role in 
social movement studies in comparison to their emergence. Thus, little systematic research of 
movement impact has been the consequence (Giugni 1998, 371).  
Contributions since the turn of the millennium have attempted to rectify this shortcoming. The 
surge of scholarly publication on the end result of mobilization processes bear witness to this 
(Amenta et al. 2010, 288). It is in the interest of this thesis to add to this particular aspect as 
well, to provide an alternative view that explores variables that may negatively affect prospects 
for impact when it comes to instances of diaspora mobilization, and specifically the Syrian 
diaspora. The following section will first dissect issues related to assessing social movement 
impact then, secondly, uncover the main debates regarding movement impact and attempt to 
produce viable operationalizations that seem conducive for the purposes of the empirical 
analysis. This is done carefully as I acknowledge Goertz’s argument that conceptualization of 
both dependent and independent variables have implications for assessing causality and making 
scientific inference (2005, 19). Lastly, I will deduct propositions in an effort to explain why the 





2.5 Conceptualizing impact and the absence of  
 impact 
The study of social movement outcomes invites for a challenging theoretical balancing act. 
How do social movements matter and how do we know if they matter at all? The latter question 
relates to the establishment of causality between social mobilization and impact, which is a 
difficult task (Rucht 1992; Giugni 1998). This will be dealt with at length in chapter 3. Despite 
the complexity of assessing causality, the primary reason for studying social movements is 
precisely because we assume they represent an important force for social and political change 
(McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1988, 727).  
It has also been argued that a critical problem in the study of social movement outcomes stem 
from the issue of conceptualizing success (Amenta and Young 1999; Burstein 1999; Kriesi et 
al. 1995). The success of movements have been of primary interest in the study of social 
movement impact, however, the lack of consensus on definitions have produced substantial 
variation in the treatment of the phenomena in the literature. Underscoring this point, Tarrow 
notes that “a number of taxonomies have been produced – almost as many as there are studies 
of the subject” (2011, 215).  
I will here assess seminal contributions to this topic in an effort to produce a conceptualization 
of impact that conforms with the purposes of this thesis, namely the study of no impact. The 
methodological option of studying no effect is a promising avenue that can help improve our 
understanding of the link between social movements and impact, as argued by Giugni (1999 
xxiv). It is important to stress that no impact is also an effect. As such, cases that show no 
impact are negative cases where the outcome of interest was possible (Goertz 2005, 178). These 
social movements could have theoretically affected host state policies and are consequently not 
irrelevant cases, cases that should be neglected because impact was an impossible outcome (this 
will be elaborated upon in chapter 3). I now turn to a discussion of social movement success 
because a clarification of this concept is a necessary precursor to understand failure or no 
impact. 
2.5.1 Social movement success 
Based on the notion of success, Gamson (1990, 28–29) developed a twofold conceptualization 
of social movement success. To be rendered successful, social movements had to be perceived 
by its political adversaries as valid representatives of a legitimate cause. As such, movement 
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success was based on the idea of “acceptance” by other political actors. The other aspect of 
success emphasized the acquisition of “new advantages” for the social movement constituency. 
Achieving a particular policy change with benefits for the social movement constituency was 
considered a success.  
A similar, albeit alternative view of success was suggested by Schumaker (1975). Defining 
success in terms of political responsiveness, he proposed to categorize success through five 
ordinal stages: access, agenda, policy, output, impact. The distinction between adoption of 
legislation (policy), the enforcement of legislation (output), and whether legislation had the 
intended effect (impact), were the most notable developments to conceptualization of social 
movement outcomes. This was because it emphasized the political process and downplayed the 
acquisition of visible benefits that was the focal point of Gamson’s definition (Burstein, 
Einwohner, and Hollander 1995, 282).  
In an effort to expand on these authors’ conceptualization of movement success, some scholars 
introduced a structural dimension of social movement success (Gurr 1980; Kitschelt 1986; 
Burstein 1985; Burstein, Einwohner, and Hollander 1995). In certain instances, social 
movements are interested in changing fundamental political structures in society. By altering 
institutional arrangements, such achievements would not only benefit themselves, but everyone 
within the polity (Burstein, Einwohner, and Hollander 1995, 283). As Amenta and colleagues 
note (2010), the extension of democratic rights and practices have been the most frequent 
structural impacts produced by social movements. The acquisition of voting rights for women 
and the political inclusion of African Americans in the American politics serve as examples 
(McAdam 1982; McCammon et al. 2001). 
It is important to note that structure-level impacts have received less attention in the literature 
compared to policy gains. In this thesis, structural impact is left out of the equation for two 
reasons. Firstly, the diaspora’s political motivation and intentions has never been to change 
political structures of their host states. The purposes of mobilization has been aimed primarily 
to change the host state’s policy approach to the homeland conflict. Secondly, changing 
structures is not a realistic possibility of their mobilization. Indeed, the movement’s relatively 
limited constituency largely excludes this as a plausible outcome.  
Having been the focal point of studies of movement outcomes, defining social movement 
impact in terms of successful policy or structural change has not been without criticism. “By 




Giugni (1999) raises three particular concerns when it comes to limiting social movement 
impact to measures of success. Firstly, a focus on success or failure assumes that social 
movements consist of homogeneous actors with identical goals and motives. This ignores the 
vast complexity of most social movements and disregards the cross-cutting identities that 
constitutes them (as noted above, this also applies to diaspora). As has been noted by some 
authors, movement goals are dynamic; they change over time and they tend to vary among 
different SMOs and individuals to focus on within a particular movement (Burstein, Einwohner, 
and Hollander 1995). Additionally, incremental successes and failures tend to make movements 
adjust their strategies and objectives (Gupta 2009). Secondly, achievement of goals and 
realization of failure is in the eye of the beholder. Observers and participants of social 
movements may identify this aspect differently. In addition, challengers within a given social 
movement may also perceive their success of mobilization on different terms. It is, therefore, 
crucial to conceptualize impact objectively in an effort to reduce ambiguity. Thirdly, success or 
failure overstates contender’s intentions. In some instances, the social movement’s impact are 
unintentional.16 
By studying success and failure exclusively, we limit the consideration of many other possible 
political and societal impacts (Amenta et al. 2010, 290). This has urged scholars to focus more 
explicitly on the wide range of different consequences of social mobilization (Rucht 1992; 
Andrews 1997; Giugni 1998; Giugni 1999; Amenta and Young 1999; Tilly 1999; Amenta, 
Caren, and Olasky 2002; Amenta, Caren, and Olasky 2005; Giugni 2004; Amenta et al. 2010; 
Bosi, Giugni, and Uba 2016). 
Rucht (1992) offers a conceptualization of movement consequences that distinguishes between 
two dimensions: internal or external effects, and intended or unintended effects. This is a useful 
way of looking at mobilization because it allows for the assessment of impact on participants 
of movements and their identity (Melucci 1996; Bosi, Giugni, and Uba 2016) along with 
external political aspects such as those covered previously. It is also useful since it accentuates 
the distinction between goal-related subjective outcomes and objective effects. For example, 
the introduction of new legislation that conforms to social movement claims are often 
intentional consequences of their mobilization. On the other hand, higher levels of repression 
and the establishment of powerful counter-movements are usually unintended.  
                                                          
16 Unintentional, but may be positive as well as negative for the movement in question (Giugni 1999). 
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Due to the peculiar difficulties of studying absence of impact, I employ a conceptually narrow 
and tangible definition of movement outcomes. This is to prevent the fuzziness of studying less 
tangible conceptions such as general awareness among politicians and the public, and cultural 
effects. Policy changes are easier to measure, hence why it has served as the focal point in the 
movement impact literature (Burstein 1985; Amenta, Carruthers, and Zylan 1992; Tarrow 1993; 
Costain and Majstorovic 1994; Burstein and Linton 2002). While studying policy change is a 
legitimate task in itself, when concerned with extensive social mobilization with no political 
effect, policy change is virtually the only plausible approach. This way we can track movement 
goals and compare them empirically with political processes.17 Despite the issues of 
determining movement goals as discussed above, this approach facilitates a rigid exploration 
of causal mechanisms.  
In Rucht’s terms (1992), I argue for a delimitation of social movement impact that stress the 
external (policy change) and intended (goals) effects.18 No impact is then in this thesis the 
absence of either of these two elements. This conceptualization is then concerned with the 
diaspora movement’s “leverage over political processes and the increase in political returns” 
political mobilization yields (Amenta et al. 2010, 290). To identify movement goals, I employ 
a dichotomous typology of ideal and pragmatic goals. This resembles Beckwith’s (2016) 
general and specific goals, which allows us to separate objectives based on its scope. I treat the 
question of causality in the methods chapter (3).  
Having carefully conceptualized impact and no impact for the purposes of this thesis, I now 
turn to questions of which explanations are best suited to explain this particular outcome. The 
proposed independent variables build on existing literature on this topic and reflect the larger 
debates on social movement emergence covered above.  
2.6 Analytical framework – What can explain the lack 
 of impact? 
In this section, I will lay out some theoretical propositions, which highlight possible 
explanations for the Syrian diaspora movement’s absence of political influence. This is done 
by separating internal and external factors in an effort to isolate organizational and contextual 
                                                          
17 It is important to note that movement goals are dynamic; they may he altered as the context changes. 
18 Intended effects or goals are assessed in section 5.2.3. These are formally stated objectives of SMOs (Burstein, 




explanations and construct a selection of testable theoretical inquiries.19 Although scholars have 
called for greater incorporation of these two groups of explanations, separating them here is 
more for the interest of clarification and systematic deduction of possible explanations. I do not 
claim that internal and external explanations should be kept apart. On the contrary, I follow 
conventional social movement impact literature in bridging these two groups of explanations. 
The distinction between them tends to be more apparent than real. For example, movement-
controlled variables often depend very much on the context in which the movement is situated 
(Giugni 1999, xx). 
2.6.1 Internal explanations – Mobilization structures 
One of the primary findings in Gamson’s Strategy of Social Protest (1990) was that 
effectiveness of popular movements were largely dependent on the degree of organization 
within a movement. By studying American movements between 1800 and 1945, he found that 
highly bureaucratized, centralized and unfractionalized movements tended to produce favorable 
outcomes, corresponding to some predetermined goals. This followed the logic of the resource 
mobilization theory, stipulating that organizational strength would more effectively enable the 
translation of grievances into movement activity. For movements to achieve their goals, this 
was simply a necessity (McCarthy and Zald 1977).  
A number of scholarly publications have yielded similar findings that highlight the importance 
of organizational aspects of movements. Shorter and Tilly (1974), in their research on strikes 
in France, find that organizational variables significantly affects prospect for movement impact. 
Furthermore, Staggenborg (1988), in her analysis of the pro-choice movement in the United 
States, argues that professionalization and increased organizational formalization, at the very 
least, has consequences for movement sustainability in the longer run.  
More recent contributions also support these claims. Ganz (2000) contends that social 
movement organizations with strategic resources are more likely to prevail whereas Andrews 
(2004) stress resourceful movement infrastructures as crucial explanations for policy 
implementation induced by the civil rights movement in Mississippi. Similarly, Martin (2007; 
2008), in his studies of the revitalized labor movement in the US, finds that the organization 
and bureaucratization of SMOs have major implications for movement outcomes. Another 
                                                          
19 These theoretical inquiries are not testable in a quantitative “hypothesis-testing”-sense. They are merely 
suggestive questions that serve the purpose of guiding the empirical analysis.  
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study that similarly stresses the importance of movement-level variables in explaining 
outcomes is that of Olzak and Ryo (2007). They find in their study of black civil rights 
organizations that organizational diversity is key for reaching desirable policy outcomes. In 
particular, tactical diversity, they claim, is positively correlated with the likelihood of desirable 
movement outcomes.  
Despite its popularity, the tradition of explaining movement outcomes by emphasizing 
movement-controlled variables has not been accepted without due criticism. Perhaps the most 
widely cited scholarly contribution in this respect, is that of Piven and Cloward (1977). Arguing 
in contradiction to Gamson’s (1990) claims, they contend that well-organized and structured 
social movements are precisely the reasons why they fail to achieve political impact. Avoiding 
strong organizations was deemed crucial to maintain the disruptive potential of social 
movements which, they both tended to agree, were effective to achieve political influence.  
Additional critique of the organizational explanations of impact tapped into the methodological 
flaws of Gamson’s (1990) study. Goldstone (1980) criticized Gamson for basing his assessment 
on weak assumptions and that his assertions were spurious. By a reanalysis of the original data, 
Goldstone (1980) could find no significant indications that organization was key for favorable 
social movement impact.  
The relative inconclusiveness of theory at this point makes it interesting to propose internal 
movement variables as explanations for the Syrian diaspora’s absence of political influence. 
Plausibly, the diaspora’s organizational and bureaucratic features along with its relative size 
can explain why it has been unsuccessful in its attempts to impact host state policies. I use 
internal explanations as a means to inquire into how particular internal developments have 
affected the diaspora’s influence. While theory on internal explanations tend to focus 
specifically on questions of organization and resources, it will be interesting to see how the 
diaspora reflect these elements and if both diasporas show similar or different developmental 
trajectories, despite sharing the same outcome. In terms of internal explanations, I thus make 
the following proposition:  
Internal factors, specifically mobilization structures, explain why the Syrian diaspora in the US 





2.6.2 External explanations – National political context 
Another strand of scholars have critiqued the social movement impact studies for paying 
disproportionately much attention to movement-level variables. Explaining political impact, or 
the lack thereof, must be done by looking at variables external to the movement. This follows 
the discussed political process theory which suggests that political context is the main element 
influencing movements’ prospects for impact once challengers are mobilized (Amenta et al. 
2010, 298). For example, Kitschelt (1986), in his analysis of the anti-nuclear movement in four 
European countries, concluded that political opportunity structures were important factors that 
determined impact of social movements. If the polity had some degree of responsiveness to 
external claims and strong state capacity to implement policies, then movement impact was 
much more probable. In their study of new social movements in Western Europe, Kriesi and 
his collaborators (1995) correspondingly found that political opportunity structures related to 
cleavage structures and state strength, strongly affect prospects for collective action impact.  
In assessing external explanations, or political context,20 I draw on Tarrow’s conception of 
political opportunity structures as established above. To reiterate, the indicators he identified 
were access, policy alignment, divided elites, and influential allies. In addition to these, I add 
public opinion.   
Increased access to the political system followed the established theories on political 
opportunity, as covered above (Eisinger 1973; Kitschelt 1986). Access to central avenues for 
contentious activities as well as to important stakeholders is crucial to influence politics. 
Without it, movements are likely to be unsuccessful. For example, McAdam (1982) argues that 
a favorable political opportunity structure produce expanded political access which 
consequently increases the likelihood of collective action. In turn, this improves their 
bargaining position and increase the prospect of political impact.  
Shifting alignments within the political system often relates to the change of power holders. 
This factor was connected to democratic procedures within democracies, most frequently 
elections. By altering those in power, new opportunities could emerge for movements. 
Particular parties or political constellations were more or less receptive of movement claims on 
certain issues than others. Over the course of the Syrian conflict, there has not been an alteration 
                                                          
20 The literature is unclear when it comes to distinctions between political context and political opportunity 
structures. I use political context as the overarching cluster of variables and political opportunity structures as a 
variable with several indicators. 
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of political alignment in neither the US nor the UK. While political alignments can in some 
cases be an important factor, in others, shifting policy alignments can be crucial. I argue that by 
looking specifically at how host states change their policy approach, we can better understand 
movement impact or the absence of it.  
Divisions within and among political elites is an indicator understood as important to spur 
greater collective mobilization. Splits lead to the emergence of new alliance partners for social 
movements, increasing the incentives to mobilize. On the other hand, elites may see an 
opportunity to regain power by aligning with the movement (Tarrow 2011, 166). Divided elites 
are in terms of impact seen as an opportunity for movements to gain important allies that can 
further their cause (Piven and Cloward 1977). The effects of both shifting alignments and elite 
division has been pointed out as central factors for the successful mobilization of farmworkers 
in the United States (Jenkins and Perrow 1977), and the opposition movements in Latin 
America in the 1970s (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986).  
The importance of support, or relational as opposed to pure structural conceptions of 
opportunity structures, have been stressed by some scholars. Tarrow (2011) contends that the 
presence of influential allies are crucial for movement impact. Having friends within the 
political establishment greatly increase political leverage and simultaneously reduce the chance 
of repression or being ignored altogether. The idea of support and alliance structures was first 
systematically studied by Lipsky (1968) who maintained that third parties were important for 
movements to be successful in the long run. While presuming that social movements were 
inherently powerless, having support as a political resource was deemed essential to influence 
politics. In his studies of racial riots, Schumaker (1975) in a similar vein conclude that policy 
responsiveness was indeed affected by the presence of political support. 
While support by influential allies are important for social movements, so are the support from 
the public. A sympathetic public opinion is important because garnering broad support can yield 
additional political capital. The interest of reelection makes public opinion particularly 
important for political elites (Elster 1992, 177). Strong support by the public can thus exert 
additional pressure on lawmakers to accept claims made by movement actors. Some of the most 
extensive studies of social movements and public opinion is that of Paul Burstein (1979; 1985; 
1998). For example, in his studies of the Civil Rights movement and anti-discrimination 
legislation, Burstein concludes that popular support for equality combined with broad 
demonstrations produced extensive policy changes on the matter. In the absence of public 




legislation, Costain and Majstorovic (1994) find that legislative change was the result of joint 
action by social movements and public opinion. McAdam and Su (2002) similarly show how 
movements influenced congressional voting on the Vietnam war in conjunction with changes 
in public opinion.   
More recent contributions on the topic has been that of Giugni (2004) who emphasize how 
public opinion together with opportunity structures, including support of allied elites increased 
the likelihood of policy impact by the ecology, antinuclear and peace movements in the United 
States, Italy and Switzerland. In context of the Syrian civil war, the role of the diaspora in 
framing the conflict through various media has had major impact on the public’s perspectives 
in Finland, the Netherlands, Russia, Sweden and Turkey, as argued by Andén-Papadopoulos 
and Pantti (2013). As contended, this can in turn affect policy-makers’ decisions.  
Summarized from the previous paragraphs, a favorable political context would allow the Syrian 
diaspora movements to more effectively issue their claims toward the political elite and 
subsequently increase the prospects for policy influence. In the empirical analysis, I will 
identify the indicators mentioned above as either opportunities or constraints according to how 
they affect the movement’s prospects for impact. In line with the theoretical arguments 
presented, external explanations can thus be rooted in the following proposition: 
External factors, specifically national political context, explain why the Syrian diaspora in the 
US and the UK failed to impact host state policies. 
2.6.3 External explanations – Framing the political discourse 
It is also important that we pay ample attention to the cultural dimension of external variables 
when we deal with political context. A central criticism to the political opportunity structure is 
that it deals inadequately with cultural and discursive factors. As such, the inclusion of elite 
strategies and social cleavage structures into models of political opportunities have attempted 
to alleviate this theoretical shortcoming (Kriesi et al. 1995; Kriesi 2004). The segment of social 
movement research that introduced frame alignment models have showed the importance of 
developing movement frames that effectively link a movement with proponents through 
symbolic expressions that resonate with its constituencies (Snow et al. 1986). The drawback of 
these studies lie in their inability to explain why some frames succeed and others fail 
(Koopmans and Statham 1999, 228).  
32 
 
In their studies of the development of the modern extreme right in Germany and Italy, 
Koopmans and Statham (1999) and Koopmans and Olzok (2004) theorize and concludes that 
discursive opportunity structures can help explain social movement impact. In their view, 
discursive opportunity serves as a bridge between the institutional and the cultural dimensions 
of political context. Defined as the ideas which are rendered sensible, realistic and legitimate 
within a certain polity at a specific time, this conceptual innovation can help us understand the 
resonance of ideas in a given political and institutional setting (Koopmans and Statham 1999). 
It thus tackles the critique referred to above of disentangling framing and political processes. 
Through discursive opportunity structures, these two elements are connected. 
In their application of discursive opportunities, Koopmans and Statham (1999) finds that a 
favorable combination of institutional and discursive opportunities are necessary preconditions 
for movement impact, whilst independently neither of them are sufficient explanations. A more 
recent and supportive contribution argues that the cultural context limits social movements’ 
ability to affect public policy. The discursive elements of the context constrained the US 
women’s jury movement’s political influence (McCammon et al. 2007). In Indonesia, two 
social movements were able to diffuse their messages into the public sphere through the use of 
both public and social media. The positive representation in these avenues allowed the 
movements to garner both public and political support. Their ideas resonated well at that given 
time in Indonesian politics (Molaei 2015).   
I would argue that discursive opportunities as understood by Koopmans and Statham (1999) 
are not entirely different from the concept of public opinion. In quantitative terms, we can 
expect these two elements to be positively correlated. If the public supports the claims of a 
social movement, it is a signal of discursive opportunities because the broader population 
renders the claims to some extent sensible, realistic and legitimate. Note that I do not equal 
these two variables. Public opinion can be very different from the opinions of powerholders. 
Which claims are considered sensible, realistic and legitimate may thus diverge between these 
targets of social movements. 
While Koopmans and Statham (1999) and Koopmans and Olzok (2004) seeks to draw culture 
into political opportunity structures, I intend to keep them somewhat separate here for the 
purpose of analytical clarity. Indeed, it is not part of the traditional aspects of political 
opportunity and while serving as a theoretical bridge still, I maintain its explanatory power is 
best viewed under the rubric of framing. In relation to the puzzle of this thesis, the guiding 




External factors, specifically discursive opportunities, explain why the Syrian diaspora in the 
US and the UK failed to impact host state policies. 
2.7 Summary 
This chapter has provided a theoretical background which the analysis of the Syrian diaspora 
in the United States and the United Kingdom will be based on. By providing a brief overview 
of the development of diaspora theory and diasporas political mobilization, I hope to have 
illustrated the vast activities such expatriate communities may engage in and their potential 
political consequences. Treating them as social movements in a contentious relation with 
respective host states allow for a deep analysis of organizational strategies and how contextual 
variables, both domestic and international, may limit the movement’s prospect for impact. It is 
imperative to note that these suggestive explanations are by no means mutually exclusive. On 
the contrary, the interplay of mobilization structures, national political context, and 
international political context can explain the absence of political impact.  I will now move on 
to a discussion of the methods used as well as the broader methodological pillars of which this 

























3  Method and Research Design 
3.1 Introduction 
Choosing the best research design in any given research relies on the phenomenon studied and 
on the specific research question. It is thus necessary to question the value of the scientific 
approach we opt for in relation to the primary inquiry. The researcher must carefully consider, 
on the one hand, the particular choices made in the research process itself and, on the other, 
evaluate them vis-à-vis the general strategies and criteria that governs the entire scientific 
research enterprise. This reflects the primary distinction between method and methodology as 
proposed by Gerring (2012, 6).  
The following chapter will consequently rest upon this distinction, prudently assess the choices 
made in the research process to ensure validity and transparency, and simultaneously touch 
upon the broader methodological questions in the social sciences. The assessment will include 
a justification of research design that binds together the theoretical foundation of this thesis 
with the procedures concerning data collection and analysis. Since I employ a paired 
comparison case study, I will first introduce case study research and then connect this to the 
paired comparison approach. This approach reaps the benefit of rich description found in case 
studies while adding a comparative element that offers important nuance and explanatory 
power. It is also necessary to provide an unbiased presentation of the method. Consequently, I 
therefore discuss both its strengths and shortcomings. Lastly, this chapter will shed light on the 
process of data collection, focusing on different aspects of the interview-process while 
highlighting some of the drawbacks of the data material. It should be clear that I employ a 
Weberian logic of research that aims at uncovering complex mechanisms and generate dense 
knowledge about specific processes and cases through the use of a narrative instrument of 
analysis (Mahoney 1999; della Porta 2008, 203). One may argue this is the only way to 
understand social mobilization. 
3.2 The research question and its implication for the 
 research design 
As the research centers around the Syrian diaspora in the United States and the United 
Kingdom, the design implies a paired comparison case study. To reiterate, the research question 
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I intend to answer is: Why has the Syrian diaspora failed to influence host state policies in the 
United States and the United Kingdom? The objective of the thesis suggests attribution of causal 
mechanisms (why question) and thus it lends itself well to the use of a case study approach (Yin 
2009, 9). Additionally, due to the complexity and intricate dynamics of the elements being 
investigated, the case study research as a type of qualitative approach trumps the use of 
advanced statistical methods, since such research enterprises are primarily concerned with 
parsimony and generalizability. With this choice, I go against the main-stream trend of modern 
social science, which tends to favor complex quantitative tools (George and Bennett 2005, 3). 
Supporting the choice of engaging in such methodological procedures is that social movement 
research tends to be frequently conducted in a case-study fashion. Most of these studies have 
been dedicated to research on particular movements or their dynamics over time. They have 
almost been inseparable from the nature of case studies (Snow and Trom 2002, 146). I therefore 
find it reasonable to follow the traditional “state of the art” in social movement theory and 
engage in case study procedures, albeit a comparative one. 
As the goal is to obtain a holistic understanding of the Syrian diaspora movement and its 
inability to affect politics, the case study approach is deemed appropriate. It is a historically 
interpretive and causally analytic enterprise (Ragin 2014, 35), which allows us to study this 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context (Yin 2009, 18). That I employ case 
studies in a comparative fashion is a strength that allows for retaining the benefits of single case 
studies and concurrently reduce the probability of drawing incorrect conclusions. The data 
collected and the procedures for obtaining them reflects the methodological choice, as will be 
elaborated upon later.  
3.2.1 What is a case and what is a case study? 
There has been widespread conceptual confusion when it comes to defining the case and the 
case study approach in social sciences. Treating case study research as synonymous to the 
broader category of qualitative research, or the more limited ethnographic method of data 
collection or process-tracing procedures, simply distorts the uniqueness of the approach. It is 
considered a definitional flaw by some scholars (Yin 2009, 17). In this thesis, a case can be 
defined theoretically as “an instance of a class of events” (George and Bennett 2005, 17). As 
such, it refers to research on a scientific, bounded phenomenon that is subject to a larger 




2002, 147). The Syrian diaspora in their respective host states are thus cases of diaspora 
mobilization, which have failed to obtain substantial policy influence.  
As Creswell notes (2012, 97), the case study can also be viewed as a methodology covering the 
procedure of scientific inquiry more broadly rather than being simply a method, or a tool, that 
helps us understand social phenomena. As such, it is neither the opposite of, nor incompatible 
with quantitative research tools. Despite traditionally resonating better with qualitative 
scholars, the case study may in fact employ both statistical methods and be based on a mixture 
of both quantitative and qualitative evidence. Indeed, the case study enterprise has been 
considered an “all-encompassing research method – covering the logic of design, data 
collection techniques, and specific approaches to data analysis” (Yin 2009, 18).  
Gerring’s (2004) suggested definition of the case study reflects the aforementioned 
propositions, but specifies that the study of cases is an intensive industry which seeks to 
understand the larger category of cases. The intensity of such studies is a testament to its 
requirement of extensive understanding of the phenomenon being studied. I would argue that 
research on the Syrian diaspora could also generate valuable information that could serve well 
for similar case studies in the future. In this sense it can be of analytical value because it allows 
us to generalize theoretical propositions rather than producing statistical generalizations (Yin 
2009, 15).  
3.1 The comparative method 
The comparative method is generally considered as distinct from the statistical method, mostly 
due to the difference in number of observations included in the research. The statistical method 
consistently demands large-N data that allows for advanced statistical manipulation in order to 
infer causal relations and extend results to the wider population. This demand is also its 
Achilles-heel, as smaller samples tend to provide statistically insignificant results, rendering 
the research enterprise questionable. The comparative method and the strategy of paired 
comparison can be useful tools under such circumstances and, depending on the social inquiry 
upon which the research builds, are sometimes superior to statistical methods. It is often 
considered the preferred strategy for political and social scientists studying institutions and 
macropolitical phenomena, where the number of cases tend to be few – usually between two 
and twenty (della Porta 2008, 202). The comparison between two cases and the overarching 
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meso- and macrostructural focus in this thesis reflect these conditions, thus making it a fruitful 
approach.   
3.1.1 The strategy of paired comparison 
Employing the strategy of paired comparison is conducive to the goal of answering the research 
question put forth in this thesis. Despite being little theorized, it is a widely used strategic 
approach in comparative analysis (Tarrow 2010b, 230). Seminal contributions to the social 
sciences ranging from Tocqueville’s comparison between the United States (2006) and France 
(2008) to Putnam’s (1994) analysis of Northern and Southern Italy, all engage in the strategy 
of paired comparison. It is therefore reasonable to assess its virtues and caveats. 
It is important to stress that the strategy of paired comparison is not only a residual category of 
multiple or single case studies or a degenerate version of large-N comparison. It is a 
comparative method in its own right (Tarrow 2010b, 232). Substantial literature on qualitative 
research mentions paired comparison but these contributions often confine the approach to just 
another variant of case studies, advise researchers to engage in other methods, or simply avoid 
explaining its theoretical and practical utility altogether (Przeworski and Teune 1970; King, 
Keohane, and Verba 1994). This is because it is deemed inferior to other methods that provide 
a higher degree of confidence (Smelser 1976, 157). King, Keohane and Verba argue that paired 
comparisons, along with case studies in general, can yield valid causal inferences, but that they 
tend to remain largely descriptive and unable to sufficiently explain outcomes (1994, 45).  
I contend that paired comparisons, including this research, indeed do have descriptive elements, 
but that these elements can be used in an interpretative fashion to suggest causal links between 
the independent and dependent variable. To an extent, this corresponds to the notion of process-
tracing, a technique that attempts to trace links between variables and allow for the inference 
of causality without the use of large-N comparison (Tilly 1997; George and Bennett 2005; 
Bennett 2010; Tarrow 2010a). While I do not engage directly in the method of process-tracing, 
I identify such mechanisms to provide suggestive answers as to why the diaspora has failed in 
its aim to affect host state policies. This does not, however eradicate the issue of equifinality, a 
situation of multiple causal paths (George and Bennett 2005, 20; Gerring 2012, 226). 
Equifinality remains a possibility and is a persistent problem when studying complex social 
processes such as social movements (Wagemann 2014, 52). I thus stress that the causal linkages 




Furthermore, it should be noted that paired comparisons also have other distinctive, positive 
attributes that can aid us in theoretical development as well as pitfalls and shortcomings, of 
which the researcher must be aware in order to prevent diluting the value of the research 
altogether. As Sidney Tarrow (2010b) maintains, some of its features are naturally shared with 
case studies, such as the intimacy of analysis, the insistence on deep background knowledge, 
and the facilitation of causal-process analysis. It thus retains some of the most pertinent and 
crucial advantages of case studies in that it still fosters “thick description” of complex social 
phenomena (Geertz 1973). It opens up for analyzing potential causal mechanisms in the studied 
cases (George and Bennett 2005, 21). Moreover, it adds three additional features that 
strengthens the case study toolbox for qualitative researchers.  
Firstly, and similarly to experimental studies, the strategy of paired comparison provides the 
ability to compare the impact of a single variable or mechanism on outcomes of interest. This 
is distinct from single-case studies in that it allows for comparison of the cause-of-effect 
relationship in the two cases. This increases the robustness of the findings. Secondly, paired 
comparisons can help eliminate the possibility that the dependent variable can have occurred 
even in the absence of the independent variable. This substantially increases the inferential 
power of the paired comparison strategy. Thirdly, by engaging in dual-process tracing, we can 
prevent overestimation of variables, as is a common issue with single-case studies (Tarrow 
2010b, 244).  
In sum, the paired comparison approach offers a combination of rich, descriptive analysis 
without presenting too strong of an analytical challenge that multicase research does. We can 
tease out general theoretical propositions and evaluate them through rigorous empirical 
narration. While it would be ideal to employ the strategy of most-similar-systems design or 
most-different-systems design to be able to single out converging or diverging elements of the 
two cases, these strategies are unsuited. The two cases do have similarities and differences that 
receive due attention in the empirical chapter, but they do not correspond to fixed and 
predetermined categories. By using the paired comparison approach, we can highlight observed 
similarities and differences by analyzing complex empirical material (Tarrow 2010b, 243). 
3.1.2 Cases under study 
Having discussed the central concepts of diaspora and social movement, I will now turn to 
exploring the cases in this study. The Syrian diaspora can be perceived as a case of multiple 
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larger classes. Thus, active choices need to be made in order to delimit the scope of the research. 
This is unproblematic and rather a necessity for any kind of research enterprise. The 
overarching research question and the theoretical proposals in the theory chapter are useful tools 
in this regard because they help determine what classes are relevant for the purpose of the thesis 
(George and Bennett 2005, 18).  
The class of which the cases under study are cases of is social movements. Furthermore, the 
cases are instances of diaspora-organized social movements, which then acts as a sub-category 
of social movements. To meet the ultimate research objective of theorizing why such 
movements fail to influence host state policies, the particular cases of Syrian anti-regime 
diaspora in the US and the UK serves as particular instances of this type of collective 
mobilization. As such, they correspond to the definitions of diaspora and social movement as 
presented in chapter 2.  
3.2 Methodological challenges 
3.2.1 Selection bias – a natural consequence of the research 
 question 
Selecting cases on the dependent variable has been a source of critique to case studies and 
paired comparison case studies (Geddes 1990; King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). This is called 
selection bias and occurs when the “[…] selection process in either the design of the study or 
the real-world phenomena under investigation results in inferences that suffer from systematic 
error” (D. Collier and Mahoney 1996, 59). Thus, by using the outcome on the dependent 
variable as guidance for case selection is inherently problematic because it affects the answers 
we get from the analysis.  
I do acknowledge that this thesis does have a case selection bias. However, this problem must 
neither be overstated nor understated. While the choice of the Syrian anti-regime diaspora 
correspond to the notion of having invariant dependent variables, they both illustrate an 
understudied social process that cannot be chosen by random sampling. I seek to study the 
particular occurrence of a phenomenon (no influence), which inherently means selecting on the 
dependent variable. The outcome is the occurrence of the phenomenon. Studying the absence 
of political impact requires the choice of cases where we observe “no effect”. As such, the cases 




severe. Negative cases are used to test theorized propositions while irrelevant cases are not 
useful for testing theory at all (Goertz 2005, 159).  
Furthermore, selecting cases on the dependent variable is sometimes a fruitful way to discover 
potential causal paths and variables that lead to the outcome on the dependent variable (George 
and Bennett 2005, 23). Testing the theoretical propositions put forth in this thesis can be done 
at a later stage against cases which do have variance on the dependent variable.  
3.2.2 Causality in social movement impact research 
It has been noted by several authors that linking social movement action to identified policy 
changes is a demanding task (Giugni 1999). If not outright impossible, identifying causal 
relationships in this field is challenging because we cannot be certain of whether the outcome 
could have been there in the absence of movement activity. As such, a variety of social factors 
unknown to the analyst can, in many instances, be the variable x that lead to the outcome y. 
This was what I defined as equifinality above. In order to deal with the causality-issues in social 
movement impact research, Giugni (1999) proposes several methodological choices. This thesis 
follows some of these suggestions, which arguably strengthens the validity of the propositions. 
However, I stress that the goal in this thesis is merely to propose theoretical explanations for 
the lack of movement impact, not generalize these findings to the wider population of 
movements. 
Firstly, I gather data not only on movement-particular variables, but also on contextual elements 
such as political structures and other actors. “By gathering data widely, we can control for the 
role of other actors and, hence, make a better assessment of the movement’s actual impact on 
the observed change” (Giugni 1999). In this thesis, that would be the absence of change rather 
than observed change. The most relevant actors are political elites within the executive 
administrations as well as within the legislatures. By doing this, I can, to a certain extent, control 
for the role of other actors, easing the difficulty of measuring actually observed movement 
strategies and its absence of impact. There are however data limitations on external elements, 
as accounted for in the next section. 
Secondly, the dynamic approach employed in this research allows for singling out which 
important mechanisms can help explain the outcome under study. Analyzing the Syrian 
diaspora in a temporal manner strengthens the chance of deriving which mechanisms lead to 
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the studied outcome. As argued by Amenta et al. (2010, 300), historical analyses of processes 
are the best way to examine movement influence and, arguably, the absence of it.  
Thirdly, studying how social movements fail to impact policies is an original way to theorize 
about movement impact. Studying only cases where movements do impact policies ignores the 
other side of the question, which may hide certain sets of explanations. Without generalizing 
my findings, I can contribute to the social movement impact literature by linking mechanisms 
to movement impact failure.   
3.3 The process of data collection 
To conduct this research, data has been compiled through extensive use of primary and 
secondary sources. Material from primary sources are predominantly in-depth interviews and 
conversations with members of the Syrian diaspora. These sources have provided the research 
with a unique opportunity to analyze internal dynamics within the diaspora while 
simultaneously revealing political perceptions and beliefs. To increase the reliability of the 
research and to verify the consistency of presented arguments, secondary source material has 
been used. This part of the data contains newspaper articles, reports, official statements and 
briefs, and information gathered from online sites otherwise rendered important for the research 
question. By triangulating different types of evidence, the findings are likely to be more 
convincing and accurate (Yin 2009, 116). Secondary data thus confirm and augment evidence 
collected from primary sources. Overall, it strengthens the accuracy of the research enterprise.  
It must be noted, however, that the data has clear limitations. Interview data yield valid 
information on internal aspects of the movements, but are imperfect to account for the broader 
national political contexts. A natural consequence of the collected data is that the internal 
variables discussed in the theory chapter receives greater attention compared to external 
variables. Alternative sources help alleviate this shortcoming, but it remains a drawback of the 
research as it would clearly have benefited from interviews of mobilization targets. 
Additionally, the information from interviews concerning external variables reflect 






3.3.1 Fieldwork experience and interviews  
The collection of data from primary sources took place between November 2015 and January 
2016. I had two trips to London and one visit to Washington, D.C. in order to interview 
informants. Particularly two issues challenged my ability to acquire informants for the research 
project. The first was that most of my interviews were conducted close to the Christmas 
holidays and simultaneously with the Syrian opposition conference held in Riyadh, Saudi 
Arabia. These two factors made it increasingly difficult to get hold of notable movement actors.  
To approach the Syrian diaspora, I used several different strategies. Firstly, I sampled 
purposefully by using the strategy of snowballing or chaining (Creswell 2012, 158). This 
strategy entails using informants to acquire access to other informants. This was especially 
important in the beginning of the process due to the limitation of my network within the Syrian 
diaspora. Secondly, I targeted individuals I identified as important by their affiliation with 
different SMOs. E-mails and direct phone calls as means of direct contact were effective in the 
pursuit of certain individuals. Phone calls were particularly effective because it reduced refusal 
rates substantially. Talking with potential informants on the phone made it more difficult for 
them to turn down my commitment.   
Overall, the impression was that the diaspora was responsive, but occupied. Responsive based 
on the number of replies relative to the outreach, but occupied because of the difficulty I 
experienced scheduling interviews. In total, I conducted 14 in-depth interviews21 for the 
research project. These interviews were semi-structured and contained open-ended questions 
that facilitated conversation. In this way, the informants could discuss themes they themselves 
deemed important regarding the overarching topic and simultaneously establish rapport, which 
is important in qualitative interviews (Leech 2002; Dicicco-Bloom and Crabtree 2006). 
Additionally, it allowed me as researcher to explore deep social and personal matters, such as 
emotional bonds to the diaspora and the homeland as well as internal dynamics of the diaspora’s 
political mobilization. Open-ended inquiries also maximizes the response validity of interviews 
(Aberbach and Rockman 2002). 
It should be noted that the research was subject to what Woliver (2002) calls serendipity. One 
of my informants allowed me to participate in a diaspora-organized event while I was in the 
                                                          
21 The data gathered from primary sources are unfortunately imbalanced. Ideally, the number of informants 
would be equal for both cases. However, I conducted 10 interviews with informants in the Syrian diaspora in the 




field in Washington, D.C. This fortunate event allowed me to extend my network and schedule 
additional interviews with important diaspora figures. While this is suboptimal from a scientific 




4 Background – Syrian Migration and 
the Uprising  
In this chapter, I provide a brief political timeline of the Syrian conflict, paying particular 
attention to its gradual development and to host state response. I then illuminate the formation 
of Syrian diasporas in the two respective host countries, focusing primarily on migratory history 
and how the Arab uprisings were a crucial window of opportunity to mobilize both latent 
identity and political views towards the regime. Finally, I highlight some characteristics of the 
Syrian diaspora in the US and the UK after its formation. By putting these elements in 
perspective, I argue we will get a more holistic picture of the Syrian diaspora’s attempts at 
influencing host state policies. It also provides the reader with a necessary introduction to two 
diaspora communities that have remained largely unstudied until recently.  
4.1 The Syrian uprising in 2011 and host state 
 response 
The eruption of nation-wide protests in Syria in 2011 caught many scholars by surprise. Even 
the Syrian regime, that argued that Syria’s exceptionalism in defying Israel and the US granted 
them with immunity to the regional upheavals, were surprised to see internal unrest. In their 
perspective, the regime reflected the views of the Syrian people (Lundgren-Jörum 2012). When 
protests spread from the Daraa Governorate to Latakia, Homs, Idlib and Deir ez-Zor, it posed 
the most serious threat to the Assad regime in decades (Leenders 2013). Responding with brutal 
force, the conflict soon turned violent with the emergence of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), made 
up of army defectors and civilian resistance fighters, and supported by the diaspora. Seizing 
Aleppo in Northern Syria, the rebel-fighters gained the upper hand in the conflict in 2012. At 
this point, it resembled a civil war rather than merely social unrest. A number of foreign fighters 
entered the fray, both on the rebel and regime side, further escalating levels of violence and 
increasing the number of casualties. The diaspora called desperately for greater support to the 
opposition fighters, but expressed frustration on the level of Western assistance: “you can’t stop 
barrel bombs with fruit baskets” (McKelvey 2015). With help from Iranian militias, Hezbollah 
and the Russian air force, the Syrian regime regained much territory previously lost to the 
opposition. This transpired while Islamist insurgents increasingly provided the conflict with a 
radical expression, threatening to the original tenets of the revolution.  
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In terms of host state response and attitude towards the uprising, the US and the UK have, since 
its inception, vocally supported the revolution. Both have arguably had a persistently tense 
relationship to the Syrian Arab Republic. In 2002, for example, the US included Syria on the 
list of states that made up the “axis of evil”, a group of states allegedly sponsoring terrorism, 
leading to the introduction of economic sanctions. When the uprising began, most Western 
countries intensified these sanctions. While not outright supporting the opposition through 
military means,22 the question of humanitarian intervention and the implementation of no-fly 
zones have emerged at several points in the conflict. Most notably after the Assad regime in 
2013, had reportedly used chemical weapons in Ghouta, a Damascene suburb. As we shall see 
later, the diaspora mobilized extensively for a humanitarian intervention and the 
implementation of a no-fly zone. Later that year, the US and Russia struck a deal that allowed 
experts to facilitate the removal of Assad’s chemical weapons arsenal. With the establishment 
of Daesh in 2014, a coalition of western countries, including the US and the UK, initiated an 
extensive airstrike campaign. Furthermore, they trained rebel factions to fight the extremist 
group but with little success (Moss 2016). Russia’s direct involvement in 2015 to fight terrorism 
alongside the Assad regime has made the Syrian conflict increasingly more complex. To avoid 
direct confrontation with Russia, the US and the UK are primarily concerned with the expansion 
of Daesh and other radical insurgents. While still calling for Assad’s resignation, both host 
countries have yet showed little will to actively facilitate its occurrence.  
4.2 Syrian migration to the US and the UK 
Since the conflict developed into full-scale war in 2011-2012, the vast humanitarian 
consequences have triggered waves of refugee flows outwards from Syria. In particular, 
Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey were subject to hordes of refugees fleeing the conflict. In 2015, 
the number of refugees in these countries amounted to approximately four million (UNHCR 
2015). Furthermore, many Syrians have travelled to Europe in search of asylum, settling mostly 
in Germany and Sweden, the two most receptive countries in the region. While these people 
have left their homeland predominantly as conflict-generated migrants, or refugees, Syrians 
have been crossing borders for much longer than simply since the emergence of the Syrian war 
and for a variety of reasons. I will therefore highlight some of the migratory trends towards the 
host countries in order to provide a nuanced perspective on the Syrian diaspora’s profile. It 
                                                          
22 There has been some support, for example CIA’s covert supply of arms to the FSA (Moss 2016). However, 




should be noted that migration data from the region is somewhat unreliable, in part because of 
temporality of data collection and poor documentation (al Khouri 2004, 21; Baldwind-Edwards 
2005, 11; Sadeldine 2005, 266). However, we can still identify some broader trends. 
The first Syrians to migrate to the host countries were leaving the region in pursuit of economic 
opportunities or as a result of land disputes, inter-tribal fighting or religious conflicts in the 
early 20th century (Schaefer 2008, 1291–92). As such, many of them, in particular those 
traveling to the US, were Arab Christians coming from what is modern day Lebanon. Syrians 
migrating to the UK at this time came mostly from the Aleppo textile industry and settled in 
Manchester together with other Arab communities. More recent arrivals have, similar to present 
day refugees, fled conflict, most notably in light of the brutal crackdown of the 1979-1982 
Muslim Brotherhood uprising that culminated in the Hama massacre. Many of these were 
religious figures who went into exile after the Muslim Brotherhood were organizationally 
eradicated. Also parts of the intellectual elite left on the basis of political disagreements with 
Hafez al-Assad’s regime. The intricate use of force, random disappearances, and other 
intimidation policies forced them to migrate from Syria to countries like the US and the UK 
(Sadeldine 2005; Qayyum 2011). Furthermore, the opportunities presented to skilled workers 
and entrepreneurs and favorable visa regulations have facilitated migration. With higher living 
standards, both the US and the UK were attractive, particularly between 1950 and 1990 
(Sadeldine 2005, 270). Alongside these migrants have been Syrians seeking to advance their 
education. Despite intending to return to Syria as professionals, many of those who ventured 
abroad to study have remained in the host countries. Some have suggested that this has been on 
the basis of Syria’s mandatory military service (Beitin 2012). This has also been a strong 
incentive for younger generations to leave Syria.  
In sum, the Syrian expatriate communities in both host countries have emigrated from Syria for 
a variety of reasons and for the past century. It is thus important to emphasize that the diaspora 
constitutes a much more complex set of individuals than simply political refugees from the 
current war. It is a mixture of both old and recent, and voluntary and involuntary migrants. I 
now turn to a brief assessment of the formation of the Syrian diaspora and its most central 




4.3 Formation of Syrian diaspora and some of its  
 characteristics 
In order to meet the necessary and sufficient conditions set out in the theory chapter, the Syrian 
expatriate communities must reflect all of the following indicators; dispersion, homeland 
orientation and boundary-maintenance (Brubaker 2005). Prior to the uprising in 2011, these 
conditions were only partially met. By highlighting the migratory trends towards the respective 
host countries, I illustrated in the previous paragraph how the Syrian expatriate communities, 
by default, qualify as a dispersed population. They have crossed state borders and dispersed 
from their original “center” (Safran 1991).  With the exception of descendants from the earliest 
wave of Syrians migrating to the US and the UK who, according to one scholar, underwent a 
successful shift to Americanization (Gualtieri 2009, 157), most other Syrian migrants have 
retained a distinct identity vis-à-vis host countries. As such, boundary-maintenance through a 
resistance to fully integrate have occurred in both host countries. However, I would argue that 
in terms of homeland orientation, these communities have not sufficiently qualified. While 
many Syrians (including most of those interviewed) have returned to Syria frequently, their 
dominant source of value, identity and loyalty has arguably not been with Syria. Abroad, the 
homeland orientation has predominantly been based on an identification with the much broader 
and global Arab and Muslim diasporas – at least for the majority of the Syrian migrants. Their 
overlapping networks have led Syrians abroad to associate themselves with pan-Arab or pan-
Islamic organizations instead of a national identity as “Syrians” (Jörum 2015; International 
Alert 2015). Syrian minorities, such as Syriac Christians and Kurds have kept to themselves 
and maintained their identity through exclusive cultural and religious organizations. As I will 
argue in the empirical analysis, historical conditions, such as the lack of a breathing civil society 
in Syria, along with the extensive reach of the Syrian security apparatus and a neglect of ethnic, 
religious and regional diversity in the education system, have all contributed to the absence of 
a Syrian diaspora prior to 2011.  
The 2011 uprising produced a “window of opportunity” for these communities to capitalize on 
their Syrian heritage. This has been identified by other observers as well, some referring to the 
regional upheavals as a “diaspora spring” (Khan 2012). As argued by Jörum (2015), it remains 
a fact that the Arab uprisings were a starting point for many diasporas. As indicated in the 
previous section, many Syrians who had ventured abroad had done so for political reasons. 




support to the revolution. Furthermore, the groups who sought to affect policies in the host 
country, and subsequently conflict dynamics in the homeland, had an imperative to identify as 
Syrians. It was a prerequisite to become a legitimate voice of Syrians. However, as we shall see 
in the analysis, instead of organizing collectively on a Syrian identity only, other fragments of 
identity remained important, fostering cleavages in the US, for example. In the UK, greater 
acknowledgement of these differences led to a strong focus on community development to 
overcome these differences.  
The fundamental issue is that the “Syrian identity” as an indicator for homeland orientation did 
not emerge until 2011. While the expatriate community had existed for a long time, there was 
little identification as Syrian, but rather a recognition of other identity labels. Also the Assad-
regime realized the disconnect between expatriates and Syria and thus attempted to foster a 
stronger connection by establishing a Ministry of Expatriates in 2002 (Beitin 2012). Yet, it had 
little effect – particularly amongst those in opposition to the regime. While Syrian expatriates 
are not something new, the Syrian diaspora is. 
It was reported prior to the uprising that the number of Syrians living abroad (worldwide) 
equaled the population of Syria, approximately 20 million (Beitin 2012, 2). Since neither of the 
host countries in this study have been the preferred destination for Syrian migrants, the 
diasporas are arguably relatively small. According to one report, the number of Syrians in the 
US amounted to 86,000 in 2014 (Zong 2015). However, this report does not consider the vast 
amount of second and third generation Syrians who are entitled to American citizenship, 
provided they are born in the country. As such, it is unable to capture the Syrian community – 
including those who are American but who for example after 2011 have increasingly connected 
with their Syrian heritage. Two of my informants estimated the number of Syrians to be 
somewhere around 250,000 to 400,000 (Informant 2, 2015; Informant 3, 2015). The only 
numbers I was able to obtain suggests that the Syrian community in the UK amounts to 
approximately 20,000 (International Alert 2015). While the numbers are unreliable, they still 
indicate that the Syrian diaspora in both host countries are relatively small, especially in 
comparison to other immigrant groups. The figures are likely to change in the near future due 
to new refugee resettlements.  
In the US, most Syrians have settled in and around Chicago (Illinois), Detroit (Michigan) and 
in several cities in Texas and California (Zong 2015). Due to Washington, D.C. being a center 
for American policy-making, those engaged in politics have also been drawn to Virginia and 
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Maryland, neighboring Washington, D.C. In the UK, most of the diaspora are based in London 
and Manchester (International Alert 2015).  
In terms of socio-economic status, the two diasporas are characterized by relatively high 
education levels and, at least in the US, high income levels. In the US, Syrian immigrants have 
higher family incomes in comparison with other immigrant groups (Zong 2015). Much of this 
stems from the large amount of Syrian physicians who ventured abroad. As one informant put 
it, “in all US towns there is a US Postal Office, a McDonalds, and a Syrian physician” 
(Informant 9, 2015). While having the same educational background and much of the same 
occupational profile, the income levels are lower for the diaspora in the UK. This has arguably 
had an effect on political mobilization, as we shall see later. Nonetheless, the Syrian diaspora 
in both countries are reasonably affluent. Having briefly discussed the Syrian uprising, the 








5 Empirical Analysis 
5.1 Introduction 
In this section, I will provide an introduction to the mobilization efforts of the Syrian diaspora 
in the United States and the United Kingdom. This entails a coverage of their contentious and 
more formal political activities in the period following the Syrian uprising in 2011, the SMOs 
involved and their political objectives. I maintain that it is essential to understand the 
characteristics of their widespread mobilization efforts in order to assess the lack of significant 
policy impact. I will then draw on this to present a more specified analysis, discussing the cases 
in light of internal and external explanations as suggested in the theoretical chapter.  
5.2 The development of political mobilization in the  
 Syrian diaspora 
Ever since the early risers in the Syrian uprising began protesting against the Ba’thist regime in  
the drowsy provincial town of Daraa in 2011 (Leenders 2013, 274–76), the diaspora in the 
United States and the United Kingdom has been engaged in a variety of forms of political 
mobilization in their host countries. Although not united in their political message from the 
outset, the attention devoted to developments in the homeland has since been noticeable. Five 
years of persistent mobilization against the regime in Syria has been paralleled by five years of 
consistent political mobilization in the two host countries. The methods for making claims have 
been a mixed use of indirect and direct channels of influence, ranging from extremes such as 
protest marches and demonstrations to formal political lobbying. As such, the diaspora has been 
vibrant on the political scene in their host countries, using a modern repertoire of collective 
action to encourage changes in host state policies.  
Consequently, in the following section, I will describe the political mobilization in the two host 
countries that focuses on contentious and formal political mobilization. This distinction 
corresponds to social movements’ various strategic approaches to the policy process. The 
development of contentious mobilization has advanced from direct political aims to one that 
merely stands in solidarity. Advocacy and lobbyism by a wide range of SMOs amount for the 
main modes of interest articulation and policy pursuit for the anti-regime diaspora in the 
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respective host countries today. Nevertheless, as we will see, the political gains have been 
marginal at best. 
5.2.1 Contentious political mobilization – demonstrations and 
 protests  
As illustrated in the introduction, political mobilization in the diaspora developed in tandem 
with the Syrian uprising. When protests erupted in Daraa and spread to major cities like Aleppo 
and Idlib, similar protests developed in the diaspora in the US and the UK. Initial 
demonstrations and protests occurred predominantly outside the Syrian embassies in London 
and Washington D.C. in March and April of 2011. The principal claims reflected the calls for 
democracy, freedom and dignity put forth in the homeland. In addition, the mobilizers in the 
diaspora called particularly for the closure of the embassies and the expulsion of the Syrian 
diplomatic missions. In a strategic effort to influence national decision-makers, the diaspora 
movements also organized rallies that targeted political institutions such as Congress and the 
White House in the US, and Downing Street in the UK. While carrying the same overarching 
oppositional message, these rallies called for lawmakers and the two administrations to engage 
more directly in Syrian affairs in order to prevent indiscriminate killing of civilians. Despite 
asking for assertive and interventionist foreign policies, the diaspora was not asking for large-
scale military intervention. As I will describe in section 5.2.3, the call for western involvement 
was limited to humanitarian intervention and increased pressure on the Assad-regime through 
increased economic sanctions and the use of diplomatic means.  
It must be emphasized that in the early days of the Syrian uprising, extensive counter-
mobilization by regime-sympathizers also took place. As one participant of the diaspora 
opposition explains: “[…] people were fingering to each other from both sides, throwing 
sometimes quarters and money on each other” (Informant 2, 2015). These tensions existed, and 
still does in the diaspora, but the presence of pro-regime supporters on the public scene has 
diminished in correlation with increased violence in the homeland. The condemnation of the 
regime’s brutality and the vocal support for the opposition has largely closed the doors for pro-
regime activism and lobbyism in both of the host countries.  
While the anti-regime protests have occurred with high frequency within both the US and the 
UK context, the organized marches and rallies seem to draw variable participation from the 




Washington, D.C.; some organized by the diaspora itself, others coordinated by human rights 
activists and general supporters of the Syrian revolution.23 On average, demonstrations tend to 
draw approximately 1000-1500 attendees from the Syrian communities (Informant 2, 2015; 
Informant 3, 2015). However, I would argue that these numbers are largely unreliable. It is 
inherently difficult to assess the exact numbers of participants in such demonstrations. Yet, as 
one diaspora activist notes, despite the limited number of active supporters on street rallies, 
“[…] the rest of them, they do support, with their heart, but they try not to be visible” (Informant 
3, 2015). Another participant offered a more nuanced view: “[…] some people don’t oppose 
the work, but they don’t believe it will go anywhere, so they are just not engaged at all. [M]ore 
people were involved in the beginning […] and when they realized it was a marathon, not a 
sprint, [people] ran out of steam” (Informant 5, 2015). Some participants also come from other 
communal or ethnic groups, bolstering the number of protestors. For example, Libyans 
participated to show solidarity and support in the American context (Voice of America 2016). 
Correspondingly, a notable figure in the UK diaspora activist community said that the 
supporters of the Syrian revolution have increased over the course of its development. She 
maintains, “a lot of the efforts have come from non-Syrians” (Informant 10, 2016). 
Besides carrying a political message in an attempt to influence host state politics, the organized 
demonstrations also express a strong sentiment of solidarity. The largest demonstrations that 
gained most attention and media coverage were the commemorations of the anniversary of the 
March 15 uprising. Usually organized as collaborative efforts among Syrian SMOs, these 
events seek to draw broader attention to the Syrian crisis and show visible support to those still 
fighting in the homeland. Whereas the political message to host country decision-makers 
remain an important impetus for mobilization, sympathy through symbolism has become 
increasingly important for the diaspora movements. They reify the revolutionary characteristics 
of their struggle, despite observers claiming the revolution descended to civil war already 
during the summer of 2012 (Holliday 2013). To an extent, the contentious aspect of the 
diaspora’s mobilization has become less about politics and more about solidarity. Raising the 
banners of solidarity is also a symbolic frame that larger segments of the diaspora can support 
and sympathize with. Internal disagreement on what host state policies to advocate for can 
explain this trend. I will elaborate on internal explanations further below. 
                                                          
23 For example, the protests at the Syrian embassy in London in September 2011 was originally coordinated by 
Amnesty International (Jones 2011). 
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5.2.2 Formal political mobilization – SMO advocacy and lobbyism 
Less publicly visible, compared to street demonstrations, has been the development of extensive 
SMOs and advocacy organizations. These organizations served an imperative role in the 
political mobilization of the diaspora and the particularization and formalization of the 
diaspora’s interest claims. As the uprising developed in the homeland, these organizations 
emerged exponentially (Informant 2, 2015; Informant 4, 2015). The sudden increase in 
organizations can be attributed to the diverse demands of the heterogeneous Syrian expatriate 
community in the host lands as well as covering the organizational gap in the diaspora. Table 1 
below gives a brief overview of the SMOs, that through my fieldwork and analysis, appear to 
be the most politically active and popular. It is by no means an extensive nor exhaustive list of 
Syrian anti-regime SMOs within the two diasporas; there exists a wide range of purely 
humanitarian groups focusing on aid, but still align with the opposition. Most notably, the ones 
organized in the extensive American humanitarian collaborative efforts called the American 
Relief Coalition for Syria (ARCS). There is also a number of student initiatives that are 
excluded from this list, such as Students Organize for Syria (SOS) in the US and Oxford 
Solidarity for Syria (OSS) in the UK. 
Table 1: A selection of important Syrian anti-regime SMOs and advocacy organizations in 
the diaspora 
Syrian SMOs in the United States Syrian SMOs in the United Kingdom 
Syrian American Council (SAC)  Rethink Rebuild Society (RRS) 
Syrian American Medical Society (SAMS) Syria Solidarity UK 
Syrian Emergency Task Force (SETF) Syrian Association of Yorkshire (SAY) 
United for a Free Syria (UFS) Syrian Welsh Society (SWS) 
Association of Free Syrians (AFS)  Kurds House (KH) 
Syrian Christians for Peace (SCP) Peace & Justice for Syria (PJS) 
American Syriac Organization (ASO) Syrian Society of Nottinghamshire (SSN) 
Syrian Expatriates Organization (SEO) Scotland4Syria 
Syrian American Alliance (SAA)  Syria Solidarity Campaign (SSC) 
 
The Syrian SMOs perform three political functions in their efforts to impact host state policies 
according to their goals. Firstly, these organizations engage in media activities to portray 




releases and appearing in media to comment on internal developments in Syria, they seek to set 
the political agenda of decision-makers and the public (Andrews and Edwards 2004). They also 
play a key role in shaping the image of the Syrian conflict (Andén-Papadopoulos and Pantti 
2013). In the US and UK context, media appearances have been an important aspect of their 
work. The Syrian American Council’s (SAC) representatives appear frequently in national and 
international media to comment on events within Syria and to stress their political views on 
behalf of the Syrian community. Correspondingly, the Rethink Rebuild Society (RRS), among 
others, performs a similar role in the UK. The diaspora engage in media work in an effort to 
change the narrative of the conflict to one that corresponds with their anti-regime sentiment. 
“The way that the media works is that the narrative shifts very easily. And the media doesn’t 
portray Syria as an uprising anymore, but now we talk about it in the context of other issues, 
like the refugee crisis or Daesh” (Informant 13, 2016). As such, it is crucial for them to not only 
set the agenda, but to change the existing narrative they perceive as an obstacle to the diaspora’s 
interests. This will be covered more in-depth in section 5.5 on discourse framing.  
Secondly, these organizations formulate policy options through briefs and direct interactions 
with policy-makers. For example, in 2013, SAC developed an extensive review of current 
American foreign policy towards Syria and offered solutions they deemed to be in line with the 
regional interests of the US and the Syrian-American community’s political views (Ghanem 
and Hunt 2013). On the UK side, the RRS produced a similar brief that seeks to create common 
ground for UK policy-makers and how they should devise effective policies towards Syria 
(Rethink Rebuild Society 2015b). Additionally, these SMOs arrange meetings with 
Congressmen and Members of Parliament to issue their claims and lobby the political 
establishment directly (Informant 3, 2015; Informant 13, 2016). These activities contribute to 
the legitimization of the diaspora as representatives for Syrians. As such, they strive to become 
“accepted” as an actor in the policy process, following Gamson’s (1990) typology of social 
movement success. As the analysis below will show, this has been a challenging aspect of the 
diaspora’s mobilization in both the US and the UK. 
Thirdly, the SMOs are important because they organize collective action. Political rallies and 
marches, as covered above, are usually organized through coordination between several of the 
important SMOs listed below. For example, the recent March 15 anniversary events in the US 
was organized by more than 30 different Syrian political, humanitarian and community 
organizations (Informant 7, 2015). The coordination is based on a notion that “size matters”, 
which has, by some social movement scholars, been claimed to be important for political impact 
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(DeNardo 1985; Amenta et al. 2014). The nature of collaboration and coordination between 
different SMOs within the Syrian diaspora, or rather the absence of it within formal political 
mobilization, will be discussed more extensively in the discussion section below.  
5.2.3 Political objectives – ideal and pragmatic goals 
The diaspora in both cases have a wide set of political goals. As noted previously, such goals 
are dynamic and vary internally in social movements. Different SMOs often have different 
goals and these also tend to vary over time (Burstein, Einwohner, and Hollander 1995). This 
section demonstrates this. I employ a typology of social movement goals that separates ideal 
goals from pragmatic goals.24 It partially reflects the distinction between general and specific 
goals, which corresponds to a notion of particularity in movement objectives (Beckwith 2016, 
61).  
Ideal goals are ultimate visions that, if achieved, would radically reorder movement intentions 
and aims. These goals can be considered as overarching goals that help maintain movement 
coherence because of their general character. These goals are also the most difficult ones to 
achieve since they can be structural in character and because they are sometimes outside of the 
national political sphere the movement aims to influence. As such, pragmatic goals are often a 
sub-set of achievable goals that increase the prospects of reaching ideal goals. These are often 
much easier to achieve because they are more specific and, in some cases, easier for national 
policy-makers to implement.  
Pragmatic goals are sometimes also a source of internal conflict within a social movement. 
They may reflect the perceptions of the SMO and sympathizers and not always that of the wider 
movement. I maintain that this distinction is useful because it allows for a particularization of 
policy-specific aims and thus differentiate between goals that are directly transferable to the 
national political processes and those that are outside the direct reach of these decision-makers. 
I will illustrate these differences subsequently by highlighting some of the ideal and pragmatic 
goals held by the Syrian diaspora SMOs, particularly SAC in the US and RRS in the UK.  
Ideal goals 
The ideal goals of the Syrian diaspora have been developed since the outset of the Syrian 
uprising in 2011. These have been relatively stable over the past five years with only minor 
                                                          




changes based on the intensification of violence and political developments in the host 
countries. These frames are legitimate and resonate well within the politically mobilized 
diaspora. Due to their solidarity approach to the revolution and general anti-regime sentiment, 
many of the SMOs have mission statements that is to develop a pluralistic, free, inclusive and 
democratic Syria. These goals are held by several organizations, such as SAC, SETF and UFS 
in the US. SAC, for example, state that their mission is to “empower the Syrian-American 
community to organize and advocate for a free, democratic, and pluralistic Syria through 
American support” (Syrian American Council 2016). While not having a mission statement 
seeking democracy and freedom as explicitly as SAC, the RRS in the UK seek to strengthen 
the position of Syrians within their host community. As such, their ideal goals are based more 
on improving the perception of the Syrian community in the host state through the 
empowerment of Syrians politically and socially (Rethink Rebuild Society 2016a). However, 
their political perspectives become clear when media appearances and press releases are 
scrutinized. RRS maintains that the brutal dictatorship of the Assad-regime is the root cause of 
the Syrian conflict (Informant 13, 2016). These SMOs are thus similar with respect to their 
ideal goals. 
Pragmatic goals 
The pragmatic goals serve as examples of concrete policy proposals that are being advocated 
for. While freedom and democracy in Syria are end-goals in their own right, pragmatic goals 
can be identified as policy options that need to be in place for the ideal goal to be achieved. 
Several proposals have been made over the past five years, and these have also fluctuated 
according to developments on the ground in Syria. I identify several particular goals advocated 
by the diaspora in the US and the UK. These are listed in Table 2 below, along with a brief 
summary of outcome.   
Pragmatic goals seems to be the most widely contested internally – particularly the issues 
concerning support to the moderate military opposition. Thus, I do not claim that the entire 
diaspora supports this, but rather illustrate that some of these groups consider it an important 
policy and have thus mobilized in favor of it. The remaining pragmatic goals are less contested 
in the diaspora. The subsequent analysis do not intend to scrutinize the policy process for each 
of these goals separately. Such a task would be too demanding in terms of data collection and 
require greater intimacy to the actual processes. Instead, these goals serve as an indication of 
what has been attempted, and combined with ideal goals, will permeate through the evaluation 
of internal and external explanations as set out in the theory chapter.   
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Table 2: Political objectives of the Syrian diaspora and outcome 
Type of goal Political objective Outcome 
Ideal Facilitate the ousting 
of the Assad-regime. 
Failure: The Assad-regime continues to reign in 
Syria and, with the help of Russia, Iran and 
Hezbollah, gained a strong hold on key areas. 
Neither the US nor the UK have been convinced 
to bring about regime-change in Syria.   
Pragmatic Arming moderate 
rebels to fight the 
Assad-regime.  
Failure: Rebels have not been armed for defeating 
the Assad-regime, but to fight Daesh. This 
happened as a response to the beheading of US 
journalists James Foley and Steven Sotloff and not 
because of diaspora mobilization. 
Pragmatic Guarantee civilian 
protection.25 
Failure: Implementing no-fly zones have been 
debated, but the vote in the UK parliament failed, 
and in the US, Obama pulled back his initiated 
Congress vote.     
Pragmatic Humanitarian 
intervention. 
Failure: The US and the UK have considered 
intervening following the responsibility to protect 
doctrine, but neither have been convinced to do 
so. 
Pragmatic Remove obstacles 
hindering money 
transfer (hawala). 
Failure: Syrian bank accounts are closed. Host 
states fear that Syrians in the diaspora may 
support terrorist groups in the homeland trumps.  
Pragmatic Substantially increase 
refugee resettlement 
rates. 
Failure: Both host countries have increased 
refugee numbers since 2011, but the diaspora do 
not consider it substantial. They have not been 
able to convince policy makers to increase these 
numbers. 
                                                          
25 The Syrian diaspora advocates for civilian protection through three different policies. 1) Safe zone: civilian 
areas protected and secured by ground troops, similar to safe areas implemented in Bosnia in 1993. 2) No-fly 
zone: areas with no regime aerial activity allowed (enforced by international coalition), such as employed in 
Libya in 2011. 3) No-bombing zone: ban on aerial bombardment enforced by ships in the Mediterranean (The 




5.3 Internal explanations – Mobilization structures 
To demonstrate the rationale for this section of the thesis, I will reiterate the proposition made 
in the theory chapter is appropriate:  
Internal factors, specifically mobilization structures, explain why the Syrian diaspora in the US 
and the UK failed to impact host state policies.   
As such, the objective here is to lay out the characteristics of mobilization structures with the 
intention to scrutinize its effects on the diasporas political influence. Evidently, the dynamics 
of mobilization has had an important effect in both cases of diaspora mobilization, but as the 
analysis will show, done so differently. Different trajectories seem to have led to similar 
outcomes. I will first analyze one element that is common for both cases, namely the absence 
of civil society experience in Syria. I will then proceed with each case to illustrate mentioned 
trajectories and link them to the main questions of this section. 
5.3.1 Shared internal factors explaining the lack of influence – Lack 
 of civil society experience 
Despite having been in the US and the UK for a relatively long period of time, it is remarkable 
how little Syrian mobilization existed before the uprising, both on a political, professional and 
civil society level. Several of my informants in both cases have pointed to an important aspect 
that in itself is both historical and contextual; the imbalance between state and civil society, or 
as claimed by some, the complete absence of a proper civil society in Syria under Baathist rule 
(Informant 6, 2015; Informant 13). As argued by Hinnebusch, (1993) the strong Baathist state 
developing after the tumultuous 1960s “[…] deadened the fragile political life of the pluralist 
era and narrowed the autonomy of the civil society.” Indeed, the period prior to the Baath era 
saw relatively strong social mobilization and organization. However, Baathist rule coopted 
most aspects of the emerging civil society, including popular and professional associations. It 
pursued redistributive policies that kept social distinctions at bay and built a cross-sectarian 
support-base, most notably with wealthy Sunni business elites (Ismail 2012; Haddad 2012; 
Haddad and Wind 2014). It also deterred people from developing new and independent 
organizations through tactical repressive measures: 
 When I got imprisoned, they told me that gathering was not allowed in Syria. I told them, 
 “We were just friends sitting together, and it was not even a secret. The door was open.” 
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 He replied, “Do you understand me? It is forbidden to sit three together”. […] If they 
 see that you are three together, they get afraid that you may be doing something 
 organized (Informant 4, 2015). 
The quote might seem as an exaggeration of the extent to which civil society was strategically 
muted, but it nonetheless illustrates the repressive tactics and deterrence of individuals and 
indicate how these strategies fostered a sense of fear for organizing anything outside the 
immediate social sphere. As claimed by several informants, years of being under an oppressive 
regime ingrained a reluctance to mobilize at all in fear of being turned in and delivered to the 
hands of the security forces: “We have an expression in Syria that ’the walls have ears’” 
(Informant 2, 2015). This referred to the notion that all who expressed criticism towards the 
regime would be heard and reported. The fear that even your closest relatives could turn on you 
ultimately nurtured a culture of skepticism and lack of trust in civil society. Under the extensive 
array of emergency laws instigated in the 1960s under Hafez al-Assad’s rule, arbitrary arrests 
and detention effectively suspended all personal liberties (Ghadry 2005). It limited individual 
ability to perform civil and political activities and decreased motivations for social mobilization 
altogether. Consequently, this had ramification for those who remained in Syria and those who 
migrated to other countries. Low levels of trust has endured in the diaspora and limited efforts 
to organize collectively.  
Furthermore, the fear of the security apparatus have extended beyond merely the borders of 
Syria. Evidence from Amnesty International (2011) and as argued by several scholars (Qayyum 
2011; Jörum 2015), the Mukhabaraat26 have had extensive methods of keeping Syrian civil 
society within diaspora communities at bay and preventing it from blooming. Repressive 
capacities that have traditionally been treated as confined to national borders in social 
movement theory is, in this case, transnational and extensive. It has produced an even stronger 
infringement on Syrians’ ability to engage in organized activities.  
In the US, for example, the Syrian security apparatus worked through the Washington, D.C. 
embassy, enlisting supporters of the regime in the diaspora to deter fellow Syrians from 
engaging in opposition activities (Informant 2, 2015). Before the closure of the embassy, 
Mohamad Anas Haitham Soueid, a Syrian expatriate living in Virginia, was convicted for 
having collected recordings of Syrian protestors demonstrating in front of the embassy, and 
subsequently provided the material to the Syrian Mukhabaraat (Federal Bureau of Investigation 
                                                          




2012). Being active on the political scene would not only put yourself at risk, but also family 
and friends back in the homeland: 
 Some decided not to get involved [politically] because they feared the revenge of the 
 government on their family back home. I hesitated in the beginning, because I have eight 
 brothers and sisters and their wives and kids […] If [the security apparatus] knew I 
 was involved against the government with any activities, they would go after my family 
 […] (Informant 3, 2015).   
It is not just fear of the security apparatus that has prevented the emergence of a civil society. 
Arguably, the structure of the educational system has had a limiting effect. In the education 
system, school curriculums have systematically undermined Syria’s ethnic, religious and 
regional diversity. As part of its political ideal of equality, the regime intended to downplay 
divergent traditions, unique languages and customary differences between communal groups 
and front the idea of a general Arab national identity. The lack of cultural knowledge was 
ultimately reinforced by school curriculums that refrained from explaining diversity and, rather 
than promoting it as a source of strength, disregarded it completely: “The regime didn’t really 
encourage Syrians to know each other. Our curriculum doesn’t explain anything about Syria’s 
diversity” (Informant 12, 2016). As argued by Landis (2003), the regime had committed itself 
to eliminate all differences.  
When Syrian Kurdish protests against political discrimination27 erupted in Al Qamishli in the 
northeastern part of Syria in 2004, non-Kurdish Syrians in other areas of the country did not 
understand. A common assumption was that the Kurdish question only existed in neighboring 
Iraq or Turkey. It thus seemed puzzling for many Syrians to observe this in their own country 
(Informant 12, 2016). The consequences was that discovery of differences in the diaspora was 
interpreted as division rather than just simply diversity. A diversity that could have been used 
strategically to promote the diaspora voice as united, but that on the contrary, signaled deep-
rooted cleavages, particularly in the US. Whereas diversity was unproblematic prior to 2011, 
the uprising invoked a serious rift. “When there is no crisis, it is easy to overlook certain things, 
but when a crisis happens, everybody apparently discovers his original hat” (Informant 12, 
2016).  
In an attempt to address this issue, recent diaspora initiatives tried to establish Syrian 
organizations that focus exclusively on civil society competence, both in the diaspora and in 
                                                          
27 Marginalization from politics and ineligible for Syrian citizenship (Gambill 2004).  
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certain parts of Syria. Through advocating non-violence, resistance to radicalization, and 
greater social coherence, they seek to form a future Syria that, instead of resembling fracture 
and division, resembles unity through a common Syrian identity. One activist for example 
claimed that besides being principally against the regime, another objective was to develop a 
pluralistic Syrian society with equal access to citizenship, without discrimination of gender, 
ethnicities, sects or any denomination of cultural adherence (Informant 6, 2015). Such a project 
emerged after both the Syrian opposition (the Syrian National Council) and the Syrian-
American diaspora failed to develop united and inclusive institutions. It reinforces the argument 
that no civil society had emerged in Syria and the acknowledgment of its importance for nation 
building in a future Syria.  
In sum, the absence of civil society experience has been an element that prevented the rise of 
Syrian-based organizations in both the US and the UK. There has been little mutual trust within 
the Syrian expatriate communities based on the fear of the security apparatus, both at home and 
abroad and the neglect of ethnic, religious, and regional diversity in the education system. As 
alluded to in the background chapter, Syrians have identified less as Syrians and more through 
other categories such as Arab or Muslim, or particular cultural or religious minority 
associations. While the Syrian uprising changed this element, the surge of new organizations 
reflected low trust-levels, causing fractures – particularly in the Syrian-American community. 
In the UK, these issues seemed to be acknowledged, and as we shall see, fostered a greater 
focus on community reconstruction.  
5.3.2 Internal factors explaining the lack of influence of the Syrian-
 American diaspora 
The development of Syrian-American community organizations can help explain why their 
mobilization attempts have had limited impact on American politics. Internal factors reveal how 
the community, within a short amount of time, developed a plethora of political organizations 
intended on affecting national political processes. These expressions of the Syrian-American 
community were new and unprecedented. Prior to the uprising in 2011, only two formal 
community organizations representing the diaspora had developed in the US, one based on 
professional ties and originally apolitical, the other a grassroots initiative with the intention of 




A community with limited civil society experience, dormant sectarian and religious divisions, 
and low social capital faced substantial mobilization hurdles from the outset. Despite being a 
resourceful community financially, the Syrian-American diaspora has been unable to cultivate 
organizational coherence and coordination. The proliferation of organizations after the uprising 
lead to a polylithic movement structure, consisting of similar organizations, pursuing similar 
goals, but working separately instead of collectively. This has reduced their legitimacy as the 
voice of Syrians within the American political sphere and diminished their degree of acceptance 
as a legitimate claims-maker on behalf of Syrian-Americans. I will substantiate these claims 
below by discussing the empirical evidence collected through my fieldwork.  
Due to limited political mobilization prior to 2011, the political insurrection in Syria created a 
sense of urgency to develop political organizations within the diaspora. Dormant opposition 
figures that had generally remained apolitical since arriving in the US decided to return to 
politics and support the popular uprisings. This was done through establishing new political 
organizations that, on the one hand, claimed to represent a broad constituency of likeminded 
Syrians in the US (i.e. the diaspora), and on the other, representing the anti-regime movement 
within Syria itself. With the exception of SAMS and SAC, the groups mentioned in Table 1 
were all established and developed immediately after the beginning of the uprising. The creation 
of these organizations can be attributed to the initial belief that Syria would experience a smooth 
transition, similar to that of Tunisia (Informant 4, 2015). As I will argue below, there were also 
personal impetuses and motives for the exponential growth of political organizations. 
The rather surprising but important observable feature of these groups are the similarity of their 
goals and political activities, yet notable heterogeneity. It has been noted by several scholars 
within diaspora theory that diasporas rarely are homogenous entities (Sheffer 2003; Brubaker 
2005; Bush 2007). Indeed, the political expressions of the diaspora through these organizations 
(and others who have since vanished) reflect an even stronger separation between different 
Syrian identities than one would perhaps expect. Albeit the organizations would claim to be 
inclusive, the names of some of them suggest exclusivity (e.g. Syrian Christians for Peace, 
American Syriac Organization). In light of increased political mobilization after 2011, one 
informant claimed the following about the manifestation of dormant identity characteristics:  
 Syria doesn’t cover who you are anymore. It is not enough to say that you’re Syrian. At 
 one point or another you have to let it slip very clearly that you are a Syrian-American, 
 coming from this area, representing this faction… It is not going to be Syrian-American, 
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 it is going to be Syrian-Alawi-American, Syrian-Christian-American. It is going to be a 
 complex sense of identity… Syrian-Sunni-Aleppo-American (Informant 12, 2016). 
There are several probable answers to why the cleavage structures grew in the diaspora. 
Furthermore, going through these elements might provide some answers to why efforts at 
mobilizing to affect US policies has been unsuccessful. The fundamental argument of this 
section is that divisions within the diaspora have reduced the host state’s inclination to support 
their claims. It has reduced the diaspora’s credibility and reliability. After all, being accepted 
and rendered a legitimate voice by the targets of mobilization is crucial to obtain political gains 
(Gamson 1990). I identify three particular reasons for this development: 1) absence of civil 
society in the homeland historically, and its effect on the Syrian-US diaspora, 2) the 
conservative connections and regime-linkages of the early risers in the diaspora and, 3) personal 
agendas and strong personalities. 
Conservative connections and regime-linkages of the “early risers” 
Contrary to the initial spark of mobilization within Syria, much of the so-called “early risers” 
in the diaspora had strong conservative connections. Most notably with links to the 
organizationally eradicated Syrian Muslim Brotherhood28 and conservative Salafist shaykhs 
such as Adnan al-Aroor who’s radical perspectives became popular amongst some parts of the 
opposition (Lefèvre 2013, 185–86). Despite the highly diverse and heterogeneous features of 
the Syrian diaspora, the community largely reflects conservative elements and a strong Islamic 
identity (Informant 12, 2016). This is perhaps not all that surprising, considering Syria’s 
predominantly Muslim population and the Syrian regime’s history of dealing with Islamist 
activism, serving as an important factor for outward migration to the US. Arguably, the strong 
conservative link of the early risers in the diaspora have produced tensions between minorities 
in the community, in turn catalyzing division and prompted a struggle for ownership of the 
uprising and a contest to represent the Syrian diaspora. The linkages to the Syrian regime has 
also fueled this development. Thus, internal struggles in the now defunct National Salvation 
Front (NSF)29 and the affiliations of previous leadership of SAC, its Sunni dominance and their 
rather opportunistic conduct reflect these elements.  
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offence (Pierret 2014).  
29 Not only a Syrian-American diaspora organization. It was an attempt to construct a common, unified 
opposition from abroad following the defection of Abdel Halim Khaddam, former Vice President to Bashar al-
Assad and long-time accomplice of Hafez al-Assad. The following story relates to its efforts to set up shop in 




By delving into the early failings of the US-branch of the NSF, the conservative-liberal tension 
becomes perceptible. Already in 2006, the NSF was established as a transnational opposition 
organization who sought to pressure the Assad-regime and eventually was at the ready to 
assume control in the event of a political transition. It was a collaborative effort between the 
exiled Muslim Brotherhood leader, Ali Sadreddine al-Bayanouni and former Vice President of 
Syria, Abdel Halim Khaddam.  
Despite stressing liberal values including political and intellectual pluralism, conservative 
currents and internal tensions limited its ability to ally itself with the US government. To 
increase the level of inclusivity and representation in the organization, a member of the NSF 
initiative in the US suggested to instate an eleven-member council that would include both of 
the aforementioned individuals along with a representative of both Kurdish and Christian 
diaspora minorities. The head of the council were to be elected. This plan was devised in an 
effort to increase perceived legitimacy by US authorities – it was a given that the Bush-
administration at the time could not meet with an organization led by conservative figures only. 
The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood was an unthinkable partner for a US-administration.   
Khaddam, who thought the plan was a way to oust him from the organization rejected it 
immediately (Informant 12, 2016). The NSF-branch in the US could not organize an internal 
election in fear of watering out the inner cluster of conservative leaders. It would jeopardize 
their position as powerful leaders of the organization.   
It was already at the time known that NSF had issues of representation that produced grievances 
among other parts of the political opposition. Without a proper mechanism of selecting the 
leadership, opposition figures in the Syrian-American diaspora gave only conditional support 
to the NSF, substantially hampering its ability to gain audience with the White House. “We 
could have had something that was very crucial. We could have had a government in exile, even 
in 2007. It would have been legitimized, but it failed” (Informant 12, 2016). Arguably, within 
the American context, the NSF attempted to produce a diaspora coalition that could be 
legitimized for the Bush-administration, similar to what the Iraqi diaspora had done in lieu of 
the alliance that produced the impetus for the Iraq invasion in 2003. The fact that the NSF 
initiative seemed reluctant to develop American support in the first place also suggests it had 
strong conservative currents. A liberal advisor to the NSF argued that, prior to the 2011 
revolution, anti-regime mobilization was led by historical opposition figures who left Syria for 
political reasons in the past. “There was a lot of shady figures around, not having a lot of contact 
inside Syria and as left-wing and Islamist intellectuals were very weary of contact with the 
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Americans” (Informant 12, 2016). The conservative linkages between the NSF and the old 
Syrian opposition was in and of itself problematic for generating an alliance with the US 
government. Along with the conservative elements of the Syrian American Council and 
linkages to the Syrian government during its inception, the early anti-regime mobilizers had 
issues generating grassroots support both within Syria and in the Syrian-American diaspora.  
The Syrian American Council, then called Syrian American Congress, held its constitutive 
meeting in Chicago in 2006. Despite having developed into a rigid and vocal oppositional force 
against the Assad-regime since 2011, it reflected in its early stages a much more modest 
political alignment. One informant blatantly claimed that at the time of formation, the diaspora 
organization was “pro-Assad, and pro-Embassy. It was full of propaganda” (Informant 2, 2015). 
He supported this argument by referring to those invited from Syria to participate in the SAC 
meetings. Several were Syrian government officials, among them Bouthaina Shaaban30, key 
advisor to Assad and a candid defender of the regime. Another informant, who took part in the 
first meetings of SAC in 2006 and 2007 contended that “[SAC] didn’t really align themselves 
with the opposition nor with the regime. They chose a mix of identities… they aligned 
themselves with ‘the reform’” (Informant 9, 2015). In a sense, it was the only thing possible at 
the time. Arguably, repressive measures were an important limitation to SAC’s political 
expression in the beginning. A member of SAC maintained that at an early stage, they pitched 
in the idea of gradual democratic change: “we brought in opposition figures to slowly try to test 
the waters” (Informant 7, 2015). It nonetheless developed a skepticism from members of the 
diaspora. Despite being a strong organization, it was perceived as opportunistic rather than 
serious (Informant 12, 2016).  
Consequently, once protests emerged in Syria, the Syrian-American community withheld 
absolute support of SAC’s mission. Since it was the only political diaspora organization in 
existence prior to 2011, Syrian-Americans were left with three options: 1) accept and 
collaborate with SAC despite their shortcomings, 2) establish a new diaspora organization, or 
3) abstain from political mobilization. To work under SAC’s umbrella was problematic for 
many because they did not see past the strong connection to the Syrian regime in SAC’s past. 
It was also challenging to accept SAC’s inherent Sunni-dominance from the outset (Informant 
12, 2016). Similar to the NSF, the Sunni-dominance of SAC emanated from the conservative 
linkages of its previous members. Louay Safi, fellow at Georgetown University and Najib 
                                                          




Ghadbian, Associate Professor of political science at the University of Arkansas, have both 
been linked to the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and served various roles within SAC (Hassan 
2013). Another informant also alluded to the Muslim Brotherhood connection. The self-
imposed exile of Brotherhood-members after the Hama massacre in 1982 had allowed them to 
come to terms with not returning to Syria while it was under Assad rule. As such, these figures 
were the most active on the political scene in the diaspora (Informant 4, 2015). 
It is important not to overstate the Muslim Brotherhood connection, but it is reasonable to 
assume it served as an obstacle to SAC’s dominance in the diaspora. Especially when one 
considers how other religious or sectarian segments of the diaspora seemed to edge for the 
second option of those mentioned above, despite sharing SAC’s political alignment towards the 
Assad-regime after 2011. Consequently, SAC’s dubious linkages to the regime, its strong Sunni 
and Muslim Brotherhood currents, and its perceived opportunistic behavior served as an 
impetus to establish new organizations. NSF, as a particularly early attempt at forging an 
opposition in the diaspora, also suffered from its previous connections as well as internal 
struggles. This way, the broader segment of the diaspora saw its interests better represented 
towards the US government through establishing new organizations. Another element that has 
been crucial for the manifestation of cleavage structures in the political mobilization of the 
Syrian-American diaspora has been the importance of individual diaspora figures and their 
personalities and personal agendas  
Personal agendas and strong personalities 
“Everybody wants to be a leader, everybody wants to be a hero, everybody wants to… ” 
(Informant 2, 2015). This quote is illustrative of a major issue in the Syrian-American 
community. Part of the reason for the development of cleavage structures in the Syrian-
American diaspora is the importance of individuals and their agendas. In order to mobilize a 
diaspora, political entrepreneurs engage in strategic social identity construction (Adamson 
2012). In the Syrian-American community, social identity construction seems to have been an 
absent strategy and resembled, to a higher degree, opportunism and ambition. This is evident 
through the development of tension within and between organizations and between individuals. 
As one informant claimed: “Some actors here think that they will go back to Syria as masters 
or that some of them will be the President of the new Syria” (Informant 11, 2016). The rich, but 
confusing landscape of diaspora organizations reflects this individual sentiment. “I’m sure 
you’ve heard of the term ‘one-man-show’ or ‘one-man-organization’. Lots of these 
organizations are one or two persons” (Informant 2, 2015). He also added that much of this 
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mobilization was around resourceful individuals, most often physicians or doctors who had the 
financial means to organize independently.   
This laid the basis for many of the organizations mentioned above. They are the product of low 
civil society experience and the tensions mentioned in the preceding sections, but also the 
product of ambitions. Individuals within the mobilized diaspora have had a tendency to elevate 
themselves and claim expertise they may not actually possess. Aptly, an informant called this 
“résumé inflation syndrome”. Participating in newspaper discussions and panels, members of 
the diaspora would claim knowledge of particular conditions in the homeland they essentially 
knew little about. The informant, who had been imprisoned and tortured in Syria based on his 
dissident activities, argued frustratingly that he would often end up in panels on Syrian civil 
society debating with individuals who would claim it had been breathing and well (Informant 
2, 2015). These individuals would often introduce themselves as holding Ph.Ds. from Syria, but 
once arriving in the US often found themselves studying for an MA. This can certainly be based 
on the lack of recognition of Syrian Universities in the US, but the informant insisted that even 
Ph.Ds. in medicine was used as a sign of expertise on Syrian affairs. Furthermore, many of 
them had been living in the diaspora for quite some time and had little personal experience with 
civil society in the homeland (Informant 2, 2015).    
Between organizations, another informant claimed “human politics” was a robust explanation 
for the development of cleavages in the diaspora. By “human politics” he referred to the intra-
diaspora differences that emerged, not based on political views, sectarian or religious 
belonging, but those of individual personalities. “There’s a lot of politics as in most 
communities. There are a lot of egos and a lot of organizations… It’s individual, sort of… this 
person do not like this person. It is sort of like human politics” (Informant 5, 2015). Arguably, 
this supports the claims of one-man-shows alluded to above. Disagreements in the pursuit of 
personal interests has undeniably been an important factor for the development of a fractured 
Syrian-American political mobilization. The internal struggles in the NSF prior to the 
revolution may also indicate similar, micro-level feuds. For the grassroots in the Syrian 
diaspora, it has produced hesitation to give any one organization undivided support. I would 
argue that the need for SAC to convey through statements that it is the oldest and most sizeable 
diaspora organization is indicative of a struggle to maintain a strong position, both vis-à-vis 
decision-makers in Washington, D.C., but also in the Syrian-American community. Ultimately, 





Summary - The impact of internal factors in the case of the Syrian-American diaspora 
The three identified elements discussed above illustrates the focal argument of this section. 
Emergent cleavages in the Syrian diaspora’s mobilization structures has reduced their 
credibility and reliability as legitimate claims makers in American politics. What seems to be 
similar political objectives were promoted through separate and uncoordinated political 
organizations. One informant argued that on the US scene, political mobilization was essentially 
an intra-group, organizational fight that had been damaging for perception. At the extreme, 
members of organizations would badmouth each other in other to elevate their own position 
with policy-makers:  
[T]here are disagreements between the NGOs […]. People compete, like, badmouth 
each other, accusing each other for everything, there is a trust issue, and in the US there 
is more, like, who has better access to the administration and who doesn’t   (Informant 
2, 2015).  
As such, these cleavages reflected a particular sense of sharpness. When one of my informants 
were asked about the diaspora’s political influence, he expressed disappointment and referred 
to the most common answer they would receive in conversation with decision-makers, “we are 
trying to do the best we can.” But because of apparent splits and incoherence, decision-makers 
were weary of constructing alliances with the Syrian diaspora. As two diaspora figures alluded 
to, the Syrians knew what they wanted, but failed to channel their message in a united fashion 
(Informant 4, 2015; Informant 12, 2016). As such, it has been difficult for US authorities to 
distinguish between different voices in the diaspora. Frankly, the sheer amount of voices has 
made it difficult for them to know whom to listen to (Informant 2, 2015; Informant 12, 2016). 
Arguably, cleavages in the Syrian-American diaspora has limited its ability to influence 
American politics. In Figure 1 below, I present a model showing how internal factors have 









Figure 1: Internal factors in the Syrian-American diaspora and its effect on prospects for 
political influence.  
 
5.3.3 Internal factors explaining the lack of influence of the Syrian-
 British diaspora 
The Syrian-British diaspora reflect different mobilization structures and strategies compared to 
the Syrian-American community. However, as the dependent variable suggests, the Syrian 
diaspora has also been unable to exert substantial influence on British policymakers. To explain 
their lack of influence, I argue we must pay attention to intragroup dynamics that reflect both 
differences and similarities with the Syrian-American community. Ideally, isolating 
explanations through a comparison of these cases should be sufficient to make claims about the 
effects of mobilization structures on influence. However, realistically – and as this section aims 
at clarifying – mobilization structures in the two cases demonstrate two widely different 
mobilization trajectories. By looking at mobilization structures in the Syrian-British diaspora, 
it becomes clear that failure is the result of its inability to establish an effective lobby in London. 
The political expression reflects a different organizational mode compared to the Syrian 
diaspora in the US. Instead of developing formalized lobbyist organization, the UK diaspora 
has largely been based on individual activist and underground networks. This is not to say that 
organizations in the form of SMOs have not been present, but rather that their significance as 
interest claimants has been limited. By delving into the weakness of the diaspora’s lobbyist 
position it becomes clear that lack of civil society experience in the homeland, consistent 
funding challenges, the diaspora’s relatively small size, and lastly, its emphasis on community 
reconstruction have produced what I call an “activisty” diaspora. Despite being better 
coordinated than its US counterparts, its position as a stakeholder in British politics have 















remained largely unrecognized. I will subsequently go through each of these elements in turn 
to show how this has limited its prospects for political impact.   
Resources - Funding and size 
Two important aspects of mobilization that cannot be underplayed in the Syrian-British 
community is the lack of funding and its rather limited size. Problems of funding have made it 
difficult to carry out humanitarian operations, subsidizing for example education in the 
homeland. Important for the purposes of this thesis, it has also limited its ability to establish an 
effective political force in the UK and, more specifically, London. When asked the question of 
what she deemed the imperative mobilization challenges, one informant emphasized this factor 
as strictly limiting their capabilities (Informant 13, 2016). Arguably, her position as a focal 
member of one of the largest and most visible diaspora organization provides her claim with 
increased credibility. Another informant who’s organization was more of an international 
character and strictly apolitical, focusing on aid to the Syrian crisis, also identified this as a 
persistent problem. Not only funding in general, but also the competition for funds between 
different actors served as a huge obstacle for their work (Informant 10, 2016).  
An interesting feature that was brought up in this interview was also a comparison to the US 
diaspora in terms of funding abilities. When prompted about the characteristics of the two 
diasporas and the main differences between them, one informant identified a discrepancy both 
related to occupations and the relative difference in salary levels of certain professions in the 
two countries. Most importantly, the numbers of doctors and their salary levels. Despite being 
unable to obtain accurate statistical data, informants on both side of the Atlantic indicated that 
education levels in both diasporas seem fairly high in comparison with other, similar communal 
groups (Informant 3, 2015; Informant 4, 2015; Informant 7, 2015; Informant 8, 2015; Informant 
10, 2016; Informant 13, 2016). A substantial portion of Syrians living in both countries are well 
educated, are primarily doctors, physicians or dentists. Yet, the doctors in the US was still 
financially more robust and thus better suited to professionalize the diaspora’s political 
activities: “It is a reflection of Britain, really. Whereas even if you are a doctor, you are not 
necessarily ‘living the dream like in the US’. Like, in the US you have a mansion, you have a 
car, you have everything” (Informant 13, 2016). The Syrians in the UK do not lack education 
or respectable occupations, income levels of physicians or doctors are simply substantially 
lower. This has reduced their ability to raise funds for political activities. Isolated, this aspect 
is not in and of itself sufficient to limit the diaspora’s political influence. However, the 
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combination of lack of funds and the diaspora’s rather limited size are jointly obstructing 
prospects for impact.  
To be rendered a credible and legitimate movement promoting some form of political goal, 
support in terms of a constituency can be an important resource. As covered in the 
contextualization chapter, the Syrian-British diaspora is quite small. Before the conflict, about 
15,000 identified as Syrians. In itself, this number presents problems in terms of gathering the 
numbers for protests and for claiming to represent a sizeable group vis-à-vis decision-makers. 
One informant also brought to the fore a mention of the so-called “grey ones”, a designation he 
used on those who had resigned from political activities based on the developments since 2011 
or those who from the outset decidedly chose not to engage (Informant 1, 2015). Questioned 
about dilemmas and challenges of mobilization, several informants pointed to the fact that many 
Syrians in the diaspora had their own worries and were thus not particularly active (Informant 
1, 2015; Informant 10, 2016; Informant 13, 2016). One of them argued: “It is too close to home, 
they just want to protect themselves by building a wall” (Informant 10, 2016).  
A smaller community also provides less contribution overall, dwarfing the diasporas political 
initiatives in comparison to other interests. Adding to this the element of disagreement on 
whether to support or denounce the regime, the political mobilization of the anti-regime side is 
even further restricted. The fundamental argument is that the Syrian-British diaspora has been 
lacking the resources required to establish themselves as noticeable political actors. Another 
element that have been limiting is the focus on non-political mobilization.  
Diaspora community development – less political? 
An observation that has arguably reduced the political capabilities of the diaspora has been its 
focus on common identity building and diaspora construction. While little experience with civil 
society has also been a challenge for unity in the Syrian-British community (International Alert 
2015), it seems to a greater extent to have been acknowledged, at least from certain segments 
of the diaspora. Rethink Rebuild Society is investing at the very least an equal amount of 
resources into its community-building program as it does on its political advocacy component. 
This program has a two-fold aim, one that is to smoothen the integration of recently resettled 
refugees by providing advice services and language training. Furthermore, the program seeks 
to bring the Syrian diaspora together – despite inherent differences – to “[…] think about issues, 
to learn about things” (Informant 13, 2016). Fundamentally, the goal is to construct a unified 




sense. This is reflected in their idea of rethinking history, identity, culture, political 
perspectives, and aspirations. “As a Syrian community, we need to rethink our approach to 
everything […] it is all a ‘work in progress’” (Informant 13, 2016). 
Similar tendencies were observed under a diaspora-organized event called Ahlan wa Sahlan31 
in a London suburb. The initiative was a coordinated effort between the Syrian diaspora and 
local community organizations focusing especially on welcoming refugees to the UK and 
providing a platform for identity reconstruction anchored in culture and history. When 
prompted about political questions, the initiator from the Syrian community immediately 
hesitated and sought to alter the conversation in fear of instigating a dividing discussion 
amongst the different attendees: “We keep politics outside this group because we’re not 
political and because we don’t want to invite more tension” (Informant 14, 2016). Community 
development trumped political advocacy. 
The emphasis on community building opens up an interesting causal question. Is the inward-
focus a suggestive explanation for the lack of influence, or has it developed as a consequence 
of limited political success? I would argue that the Syrian-British diaspora recognized at an 
early stage its challenges presented by sectarian, religious and political divides. Rethink Rebuild 
Society and other diaspora organizations began its reconciliation work immediately after the 
inception of the revolution, attempting to act as an inclusive and representative body for the 
anti-regime Syrian community. It has been able to meaningfully ally themselves with other 
organizations that happens to reflect a stronger sectarian character (e.g. Kurds House UK). 
Furthermore, the absence of mobilization prior to 2011, fostered rapprochement contrary to its 
American counterparts. The acknowledgement of differences at an early stage of social 
mobilization prevented conflict lines from emerging as they have in the Syrian-American 
community. Better coordination was identified as a crucial element for influence by the diaspora 
itself (International Alert 2015). It did not mean that the diaspora developed a monolithic 
movement structure, but rather that it was able to overcome the challenges of division. A 
possible contributive explanation to this is the ease of mobilizing smaller groups. However, it 
has come at the expense of political advocacy. A community with already scarce resources in 
terms of funds and size allocated most of its efforts towards stronger coherence, but made them 
less effective as a political interest. It lacked the professionalization developing in the Syrian-
American community, thus developing more as a network of individual activists rather than a 
                                                          
31 English translation ‘hello and welcome’. 
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centralized, powerful political force. A question that arise from this assessment is whether the 
Syrian-British diaspora was inherently less political. The answer to this inquiry seems to be 
negative. The Syrian community had to compensate for lack of rigid organizational 
mobilization by employing an “activisty”-approach to political mobilization, i.e. a completely 
different organizational mode comparatively to its Syrian-American counterparts.  
Activist networks as basis for mobilization 
Despite lacking professionalism, the Syrian-British diaspora has developed a strong network of 
activists. As such, the diaspora has, besides establishing SMOs, organized collective action 
predominantly through a different organizational mode compared to the Syrian-American 
diaspora. “Mobilization mainly happens through activist networks and contacts. We organize 
our activities on social media” (Informant 10, 2016). It is important to underscore that this 
alternative trajectory has presented the Syrian-British community with unique opportunities and 
challenges.  
Strong, but loose networks have facilitated coordination of mobilization. This is reflected in the 
diaspora’s ability to synchronize outreach initiatives such as publication of statements and press 
releases. Small-scale, or individual initiatives combined with little intra-diaspora rivalry (as 
seen in the US) has contributed to ease this process. As an example, multiple diaspora 
organizations to the London Supporting Syria & the Region conference published in February 
2016 a co-signed document criticizing the limited and late invitation of Syrians and the 
secondary manner in which they were consulted (Rethink Rebuild Society 2016b). Similarly, 
approaching decision-makers across the UK has become simpler valuable resource for the 
diaspora. One informant referred to how the network of cooperating diaspora initiatives 
simplified reach-out to particular Members of Parliament. Rethink Rebuild Society, being a 
Manchester-based diaspora SMO, would cooperate strongly with the Syrian Association of 
Yorkshire to direct a message to Labor-party MP, Jo Cox. She identified these opportunities as 
crucial for the diaspora’s political mobilization: “the networks help us understand what 
resources are spread around the country […] and it saves us from reproducing the same efforts 
(Informant 13, 2016). Her overall impression was that the Syrian-American diaspora was 
substantially more divided in its political mobilization in comparison to the Syrian-British 
diaspora. Despite the fact that there is reason to believe that coordination in the latter is 
imperfect, this impression lends support to the analysis above. Cleavage structures in the 




That the Syrian-British diaspora has developed a more “activisty” approach to its political 
mobilization has also had an effect on its political expression. While targeting policy-makers 
through direct lobbyism has been an important part of certain SMOs (e.g. Rethink Rebuild 
Society) advocacy strategy, an equally important component has been awareness making. One 
informant who were a spearhead of activist work in London put it this way: “we’re activists, 
we’re not like personnel of… you know, not sets of profiles. We’ve got access to the 
information and we are doing our best to speak about it” (Informant 1, 2015). By contrasting 
my two cases, it becomes clear what he referred to with “sets of profiles”. When prompted 
about what he thought of the Syrian-American diaspora and its professionalized expression, he 
first argued that the Syrian-British diaspora did not suffer from polluted agendas and continued: 
“[…] we’re trying to get them out of their backers’ grip […] They are not doing the best work 
that can be done for Syrians” (Informant 1, 2015). Distributing information both traditionally 
(e.g. op-eds, rallies etc.) and creatively (artistry), he deemed these as better ways to promote 
the anti-regime cause from within the diaspora. Additionally, it could serve the diaspora’s 
aspirations better. Speaking about Syria would be an important element in changing politicians’ 
approach to the conflict. As will be covered below, the importance of awareness-making cannot 
be overstated, considering the powerful challenges that both the US and the UK diasporas have 
faced when it comes to discourse framing. 
However, the “activisty” expression of the Syrian-British diaspora has produced challenges for 
the Syrian-British community. This mode of mobilization has perhaps been better suited to alter 
general perceptions of the Syrian revolution, but reduced its ability to represent the voice of 
Syrians in London as a proper and established interest claimant. Formal mobilization and thus 
a strong presence in London has been traded for a looser mobilization structure.  It is important 
to accentuate that this cannot be interpreted unconditionally. While RRS, inter alia, has been an 
actor attempting at formal advocacy work, (i.e. direct lobbyism and a frequent presence in 
London), the mobilization has been predominantly characterized by grassroots coalitions of 
Syrian activists. It has thus translated into a weak lobby, unable to exert influence on British 
policy-makers.    
Summary - The impact of internal factors in the case of the Syrian-British diaspora 
In sum, the elements identified above have all been contributing factors for the Syrian-British 
diaspora’s inability to affect policies. While being better coordinated in comparison to its 
American counterpart, the diaspora’s limited funding and stronger focus on internal cohesion 
have produced a relatively weak lobby. Indeed, its activist-features have been better suited at 
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producing coordination among politically active members of the diaspora but limited its ability 
to exert influence on policy-makers. So far, I have demonstrated how each case of diaspora 
mobilization has had a unique mobilization structure. This is modeled in Figure 2 below. 
Despite different trajectories, both cases of Syrian diaspora mobilization have lacked political 
influence. I now turn to the question of external explanations. 
Figure 2: Internal factors in the Syrian-British diaspora and its effect on prospects for 
political influence. 
 
5.4 External explanations – National political context 
Having covered the internal developments of the Syrian diaspora in the US and the UK, I now 
turn to the external elements that affect prospects for political impact. As such, I try to identify 
how each individual case of diaspora mobilization has faced both similar and distinctive 
challenges in the political process. It is important to emphasize that despite covering several 
aspects of political context in this thesis, the concept of political context as employed here is 
by no means exhaustive. As noted in the theory chapter, I aim to illuminate in particular access, 
shifting policy alignments, influential allies, divided elites, and public opinion. This segment is 
rooted in the following proposition made in the theory chapter:  
External factors, specifically national political context, explain why the Syrian diaspora in the 
US and the UK failed to impact host state policies. 
The analysis seeks to utilize collected fieldwork data, supplemented with alternative sources 
where possible. This is crucial considering potential information bias if the analysis is based 
only on one party’s perspective in an interactive political process between policy-makers and 
diaspora movements.  
The national political context reveals similar trends in both cases; the diaspora movements have 
corresponding elements of opportunity and constraints. Access to the political system has been 
present in both cases. On the other hand, shifting policy alignments, insufficiently influential 
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allies, divided elites, and an unfavorable public opinion have constrained prospects for 
movement impact. Altogether, I argue that the constraints produce an overwhelmingly 
challenging political context that, in correlation with internal factors, have substantially reduced 
movement influence. I will now go through each of the elements of political context as set out 
in the theory chapter.  
5.4.1 Political context in the US 
Opportunities 
Access 
When discussing movements’ access to the political system, it is paramount to consider 
potential available avenues and the structure of the polity. In terms of issuing claims directly to 
policy-makers, Congress and the administration in the White House have been focal points of 
interest for the diaspora. Most activities, be they contentious, such as protests and marches, 
have been targeting these avenues. More important has been the direct contact and meetings 
scheduled with politicians, arguably because of the diaspora’s predominantly professionalized 
approach to the policy process. The professionalized approach may, on the other hand, reflect 
the structure of the political system and as such, the diaspora’s mobilization is a response to 
this. Organized interests are known to have strong influence on deciding American foreign and 
domestic policies. The diaspora has had extensive access to influential politicians within 
Congress and the administration. Representatives of SAC and SAMS, for example, met at 
several occasions with Congressmen, previous and current Secretaries of State Hilary Clinton 
and John Kerry, and President Obama to discuss policy proposals regarding Syria (Informant 
3, 2015; Informant 4, 2015; Informant 5, 2015; Informant 12, 2016). If access to the political 
system was characterized by some degree of responsiveness by decision-makers, Kitschelt 
(1986) argued that movement impact was much more probable. With substantial access to 
important stakeholders in American politics, lack of access has not been a political constraint 
for the Syrian diaspora’s mobilization efforts.   
Constraints 
Shifting policy alignment 
As covered in the theory chapter, shifting alignments tend to refer to how democratic polities 
regularly experience changes in power, most centrally through electoral instability (Tarrow 
2011). Such shifting alignments may in turn be a central element spurring political mobilization 
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and subsequently affect movements’ ability to influence policy-making. In the case of Syrian 
diaspora mobilization, shifting alignments in this traditional sense has not been a visibly 
important factor. Despite alterations within Congress, the Presidency has remained largely 
unchanged. However, the policy alignment of the Obama-administration is arguably an 
interesting feature that can help explain simultaneously both the emergence of diaspora 
mobilization in the US and its limited political influence.  
Already in 2011, the Obama-administration called for the resignation of President Assad 
(Myers 2011). Syrian assets in America were frozen and imports of Syrian oil banned as 
sanctions were introduced. To the Syrian diaspora, it was a signal of interest convergence, that 
the Assad-regime was a mutual adversary. The US involvement in Libya in the fall of 2011 
reinforced a sense of optimism that the Americans would support regime-transition in Syria 
(Informant 6, 2015). Repeated condemnation of Assad’s repression and the famous “red-line” 
speech32 after the chemical weapon attacks in Ghouta, seemed as unambiguous statements of 
support to the ideal goals of the Syrian diaspora. It made the diaspora perceive the US as an 
important ally and nearly a guarantor of a Syrian transition (Informant 8, 2015). The diaspora’s 
optimism can explain its high level of political activity and mobilization during this period.  
However, the political shift in 2013 was a surprising and devastating blow to the political 
mobilization in the diaspora. The revelation that political support to the opposition had been 
merely rhetoric was unexpected even amongst President Obama’s closest advisors (Goldberg 
2016). This shift in policy alignment was an effective limit to the pragmatic goals of persuading 
the administration to actively engage in Syria. While the policy strategy of the Obama-
administration may have been the same all along, it was nonetheless a strong signal of 
reluctance to do anything in Syria. Thus, the initial policy alignment provided an element of 
opportunity for the diaspora, but its shift contributed to reduced interest convergence and 
consequently less room for policy influence – particularly on the matter of protecting civilians 
through active engagement.  
Influential allies 
Having support from influential allies has arguably been crucial for social movement impact. 
“Friends in high places” can help mobilizers issue claims to decision-makers. I treat those who 
have actively promoted the Syrian diaspora’s agenda in political processes as influential allies. 
                                                          
32 On August 20, 2013, President Obama issued a warning to the Assad-regime that utilization of chemical 
weapons would be a red line, changing his calculus on the use of military force significantly (Ball 2012). In 




They are considered acceptable negotiators on behalf of the diaspora movement (Tarrow 2011, 
166). As such, merely supporting the “ideal goal” of ousting Assad and establishing a new 
political order in Syria is insufficient to be rendered an influential ally. I here look at important 
individual elite allies and not the US generally. 
In the US context of Syrian diaspora mobilization, it is reasonable to argue that influential allies 
were present. Several notables within the administration and Congress have supported the 
diaspora’s cause, particularly on establishing a no-fly zone (equivalent to measures 
implemented in Libya), arming moderate rebels and generally stronger pressure on the Assad-
regime to resign. When she served as Secretary of State (2009-2013), Hillary Clinton was an 
important political ally of the diaspora. Most notably because of her assertive and ‘hawkish’33 
approach to American foreign policy. As conflict-levels increased in Syria, she argued for an 
early response to Assad’s violence (Goldberg 2016). As one informant argued, not only did she 
support a no-fly zone, but she also shared a fundamental sentiment towards the conflict, namely 
that the root-cause of it is the Assad-regime, and not Daesh (Informant 3, 2015). This causal 
attribution of the conflict’s development has been a critical challenge for the diaspora, as I will 
elaborate on in section 5.5. Furthermore, in an address to the Global Diaspora Forum, Clinton 
specifically addressed the importance of cooperation with the Syrian diaspora. “They are 
serving as a link between the international community and opposition activists on the ground. 
Our efforts are enhanced by having the members of the Syrian diaspora […] advise us” (Clinton 
2012). This serves as a robust argument for their mutual acceptance and strong cooperation. 
Another central figure within the D.C. political establishment is former Ambassador Fred Hof. 
He served as Clinton’s special advisor on Syrian transition in 2012 and collaborated strongly 
with the Syrian-American community. Through his influential position, Hof promoted the 
diaspora’s agenda within the State Department and the White House employing harsh rhetoric 
against the Assad regime. At one occasion, he claimed Assad’s brutality was turning Syria into 
“Pyongyang of the Levant” (Rogin 2012). On the matter of refugees, he repeatedly advocated 
admitting at least 100,000 Syrian refugees and for stronger support to the anti-regime movement 
in ousting President Assad (Informant 3, 2015). So did former Ambassador to Syria, Robert 
Ford, and current US ambassador to the UN, Samantha Power. The latter is perhaps one of the 
most outspokenly interventionist advisors in the Obama-administration and has published a 
book on “the responsibility to protect”, arguing against turning a back against genocides; an 
                                                          
33 A term used to describe aggressive and interventionist foreign policy perspectives. The antonym, ‘dove’, 
means that negotiated settlements without the use of force is preferred.   
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argument she used frequently to increase American pressure and involvement in Syria 
(Goldberg 2016). All of the above were frequently in touch with my informants, exchanging 
policy views and information regarding Syria (Informant 5, 2015).  
In Congress, the Syrian diaspora has had allies on both sides of the aisle. On the Republican 
side, the staunchest supporters of the Syrian diaspora has been Senator John McCain (AZ) and 
Lindsay Graham (SC), both known to be foreign policy hawks. Especially after the formation 
and expansion of Daesh in North-Eastern Syria and North-Western Iraq, they have sought to 
convince the Obama-administration of having a US-led coalition to destroy the self-proclaimed 
Caliphate. Despite their commitment to a stronger and more assertive American foreign policy 
towards the Syrian crisis, parts of the diaspora have perceived these approaches to be too 
radical. Especially the notion that the US should send troops to interfere directly in Syria (or 
so-called “boots on the ground”, similar to the Iraq intervention). Nonetheless, support for a no-
fly zone has been a focal interest put forth by these allies and seeing this as a pragmatic goal 
for the Syrian diaspora, they have been crucial partners in Congress.  
On the Democratic side of Congress, are perhaps most notably Dick Durbin (IL) and Tim Kaine 
(VA) influential allies to the Syrian diaspora. The states they represent have large Syrian and 
Arab constituencies, which may be an indication of their propensity to promote the Syrian 
diaspora’s political interests. Durbin and Kaine have actively lobbied for guaranteeing civilian 
protection in Syria. In a bipartisan letter to President Obama, all of the above Senators urged 
the establishment of humanitarian safe zones in Syria. This would ultimately mean to deter 
Syrian aircrafts from continuously dropping barrel bombs in certain areas of the country34 
(Wong 2015). The Syrian diaspora has promoted this as a crucial policy since the inception of 
the regime’s bombing campaigns. Furthermore, all of these Senators have called for the Obama-
administration to admit greater numbers of Syrian refugees. Thus, they have all been important 
partners for the diaspora.  
Despite having aided the Syrian-American community within the political establishment, these 
political notables have not been influential enough. To illustrate and validate this argument, 
there are several indications of why the diaspora’s allies have not been able to affect policy 
changes in any meaningful sense. As Secretary of State, Clinton had high influence on the 
foreign policy trajectory, but yet were unable to follow her own policy principles. In response 
to Obama’s organizing principle, “don’t do stupid s***” in which he referred to the problematic 
                                                          




foreign policy of the Bush-administration, she argued that this had produced the power vacuum 
in the region allowing jihadist groups such as Daesh and Jabhat al-Nusra to emerge and gain 
foothold. President Obama strongly resented this causal claim and rejected her policy approach. 
He maintained that Syria did not warrant military intervention, arguing that the Assad-regime 
did not threaten US interests to any significant degree. Samantha Power had also been in intense 
arguments with President Obama in National Security Council meetings, favoring a more 
assertive approach. In a frustrated response, he had once quipped “Samantha, enough, I’ve 
already read your book” (Goldberg 2016). In sum, neither were sufficiently influential to have 
President Obama and his closest advisors change their minds on the Syria-policy. 
Fred Hof resigned from the State Department after having served as special advisor for only 
half a year. According to an informant, he left because he advocated helping Syrians remove 
the Assad-regime. “He repeatedly recommended things, but the Obama-administration kept 
saying no, they didn’t want to get involved at all” (Informant 3, 2015). After resigning, he has 
continuously criticized President Obama for his “mistaken Syria-policy”, particularly 
emphasizing the loss of credibility to American foreign policy in light of the red line bluff. 
During my fieldwork, SAC invited me to a diaspora community event where Hof was present. 
He appeared as an important, but resigned ally when it came to affecting the administration’s 
policy orientation and has continuously criticized the US approach to the Syrian conflict ever 
since leaving his post (e.g. Hof 2016). 
Obama’s reluctance to make a move on Syria, despite strong lobbyist efforts by the diaspora 
and its allies, may reflect the inherent power vested in the executive branch. In the end, the 
President has substantial prerogatives in formulating foreign policy. In Congress, the limited 
impact of the influential allies is twofold. Firstly, the fraction of Congressmen actively allied 
with the diaspora and promoting their interests were rather limited. Secondly, internal splits and 
partisan alignments have been an impairment towards cooperation on a wide range of issues, 
not only the Syrian cause. The division of elites is what I turn to next. 
Division of elites 
As argued in the theory chapter, the division of elites can be an indicator suggesting higher 
propensity for movement impact (Piven and Cloward 1977). Here I argue that this has been a 
limiting factor for the Syrian diaspora. Part of the reason it has been unable to gain effective 
policy achievements has been because of the division between elites, more specifically the 
robust partisan divide between Republicans and Democrats. This is evident by looking 
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particularly at the lobbyist efforts of the diaspora in Congress. One informant argued that the 
polarization on the on Capitol Hill is a major disappointment to their advocacy work: “Part of 
the issue I think is, the people on the Hill, like the Republicans, like McCain and others who 
has been really supportive [of our cause], have also been against Obama from day one on 
everything else” (Informant 5, 2015). He stressed that this was a problem on both sides of the 
aisle; the Democrats would stick with President Obama and his Syria policy while Republicans 
would criticize every policy proposal on the matter, even if they were principally for it. As such, 
work on Capitol Hill with particular members of Congress have often stranded, simply because 
partisan lines have obstructed cooperation. On a discussion of responsivity of influential 
politicians, another informant reinforced this argument of the impact of the political divide on 
the diasporas work. He argued that the Democrats wanted to blame the Republicans for 
obstructing the acceptance of more Syrian refugees (Informant 2, 2015). While this may be 
found to be representative of attitudes amongst politicians towards immigration more generally, 
it still strengthens the effect of division and how it has limited the effect of the diaspora’s 
mobilization. 
The Congressional divide is not something that exclusively applies to the Syrian diaspora’s 
political mobilization; it reflects a broader political phenomenon that limits its ability to pass 
laws. As such, it may have ramifications for social movements in general – especially those that 
seek some kind of policy change. Whereas division of elites along partisan lines have served to 
limit probability of movement impact, it is important to note that not all Congressional activity 
is unequivocally partisan. The introduced bill that would authorize the use of military force as 
a response to chemical weapons in the fall of 2013 reflected a split between hawks and doves 
of foreign policy rather than party lines. In the end, President Obama decided to postpone the 
vote indefinitely, allowing more than 185 members of Congress to remain undecided on the 
issue (Hudson 2013). This in itself is also an indicator of the diaspora’s lack of political 
influence on the matter. While allies in the political establishment is important in that they 
promote movements’ objectives, the vast range of allies for the Syrian-American community 
has not been able to make a difference, politically.       
Public opinion 
The question of how public opinion relate to social movements is complex as evidenced by the 
discussion in chapter 3. It is rather inconclusive whether social movements can affect policy 
change directly without a supportive public (Vráblíková 2013). Due to limits of available data, 




an accurate picture of support to the diaspora movement in general. By intervention, I mean the 
employment of military assets to impose a no-fly zone and utilization of targeted strikes to 
shield civilians from indiscriminate bombing. There also seems to be some form of consensus 
in the Syrian diaspora for this type of intervention (Ghanem and Hunt 2013, 3). I argue that 
public opinion has been a significant constraint on the diaspora’s ability to persuade decision-
makers in this regard. I base my argumentation largely on statistical data provided by Pew 
Research Center.  
In 2012, after a year of increasingly violent responses to peaceful protests in Syria but before 
the chemical weapon attacks in Ghouta, a sample of Americans were asked whether the US 
should assume responsibility and act. Nearly two-thirds of those asked (64%) expressed a 
negative sentiment towards any US intervention (Table 3). 25% of the participants favored a 
US military response and 11% responded that they did not know. Interpreting these numbers 
need to be done with utmost care, especially since the question does not inform what type of 
responsibility the US should assume in particular.35 Nonetheless, the figures indicate a 
substantial opposition towards US intervention. In comparison with other conflicts where a 
similar political question has been raised, the trend seems to suggest that the public have 
become increasingly reluctant to support American interventions abroad since the first data 
entry in the comparison.  
Table 3: US interventions 








Fighting in Syria (3/12)36  25% 64% 11% 
Fighting in Libya (3/11)  27% 63% 10% 
Ethnic genocide in Darfur (12/06)  51% 36% 13% 
Ethnic fighting in Kosovo (3/99)  47% 46% 7% 
Fighting between Serbs and Bosnians 
(6/95) 
 
30% 64% 6% 
Source: PEW Research Center (2012) 
As such, it can indicate that the Administration’s unwillingness to intervene is supported by the 
public opinion. While it does not say anything about what constraints lack of public support 
                                                          
35 For the sake of transparency, all survey questions (and answer options) used is recited in full in Appendix 1. 
36 Month and year of survey. 
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imposes on the diaspora’s prospects for movement impact, the fact that public opinion was used 
by Vice President Joe Biden as an argument to justify non-intervention suggests that it has 
impacted the policy process (Goldberg 2016). It is safe to assume that it did not enhance the 
diaspora’s agenda. An interesting counterfactual example is Libya in 2011 where the US 
together with NATO allies intervened despite limited popular support. This observation 
suggests that public opinion is perhaps only used as consultation rather than a direct influence 
on policy-making. At least, in the Libya-intervention, it was not a decisive factor.   
After the revelation in August 2013 that the Assad-regime had utilized chemical weapons, the 
American public opinion displayed an even stronger opposition to US-engagement in Syria 
(Figure 3). 63% opposed, whereas 28% were in favor of an intervention. Part of the explanation 
for the overwhelming negative reply on this survey may be because of how the question is 
phrased. Compared to the 2012-survey, the 2013-survey asked whether the respondent favored 
or opposed military airstrikes against Syrian targets and as such pinpoints direct measures. 
However, it still reflects a largely negative opinion towards an assertive US-role in the Syria 
conflict, conforming to the sentiments of 2012.  
Figure 3: American attitudes towards airstrikes against Syria 
 











Despite the limited comparability of presented data, it can be argued that the Syrian diaspora’s 
effort to mobilize for stronger US involvement in Syria has been against the backdrop of an 
unsupportive American public. That Congress reflected indecisiveness towards the proposed 
authorization of the use of force in Syria and the fact that the Obama-administration postponed 
the bill indefinitely could suggest that public opinion was indeed a decisive, intervening 
variable mediating the influence of the diaspora movement (Burstein 1985; Burstein 1999). In 
this case, the Syrian diaspora was unable to impact politics without public support. In 
comparison to the findings of McAdam and Su (2002), the social movement has not been able 
to influence policy-making in conjunction with public opinion. The diaspora has convinced 
neither the public nor decision-makers. This reflects a broad challenge of the diaspora, to which 
I turn to in section 5.5 – discursive framing.  
So far, this section on political context in the US indicates that shifting policy alignment, 
divided elites, insufficiently influential allies, and lack of support by the public together can 
explain in part why the Syrian-American community had no impact on US policies. In the next 
section, I analyze the political context in the UK by employing the same set of indicators.  
5.4.2 Political context in the UK 
Opportunities 
Access  
For the Syrian diaspora in the UK, access has not been a substantial political constraint for 
political influence. In terms of political protests, public areas in London, such as the Prime 
Minister’s residence, have served as central avenues of interest mobilization. The focal point of 
reference for its political advocacy has been Parliament and thus individual Members of 
Parliament (MPs), including those represented in Government. Several of those interviewed 
expressed the availability of MPs in terms of scheduling meetings or inviting them to diaspora-
initiated events. “We’ve managed to get ourselves into places like the parliament here […] We 
spoke to all sorts of MPs, we delivered [our messages]” (Informant 1, 2015). In the fall of 2015, 
Syria Solidarity UK organized, in cooperation with Labour MP Gisela Stuart, an event within 
the House of Commons aiming to shed light on developments in Syria. The event emphasized 
in particular Syrian voices from the diaspora community. Furthermore, Syrian activists and 
organized advocacy organizations have had access to the Foreign Affairs Committee, a 
particularly important forum for discussions revolving UK foreign policy developments 
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(Informant 13, 2016). This is an additional indication of open characteristics of political 
structures in the UK context. In terms of theory, limit of access has not been a constraining 
factor considering the relative degree of openness of these channels of influence. It is however, 
important to refer back to the mode of mobilization; the lack of formalization may provide some 
evidence as to why the diaspora have been unable to voice their opinion openly in the Foreign 
Affairs Committee. Clearly, this is a source of great frustration in the diaspora (Rethink Rebuild 
Society 2015a) 
Constraints 
Shifting Policy Alignment 
Similar to the US case, there has been no notable electoral realignments with ramification for 
the diaspora’s prospect for movement influence. David Cameron’s Conservative Cabinet has 
been in power since 2010,37 before the Syrian uprising. As such, the polity has been relatively 
stable in terms of political alignments. However, shifting policy alignment also seems an 
important element that revealed a lack of interest convergence between UK policy-makers and 
the diaspora, thus lowering prospects for impact. As with the US example above, the political 
disputes regarding the pursuit of a more assertive foreign policy approach in response to the 
chemical weapon attacks in Ghouta in 2013 provides an apt example. 
Some observers note that the UK had been one of the most enthusiastic supporters of direct 
confrontation against the Syrian regime in 2012 and 2013 (Gaskarth 2016). Following a similar 
line as its US counterpart, Prime Minister Cameron called for a “strong humanitarian response” 
to the chemical attacks that would pave the path for an eventual military incursion. Effectively, 
it could be interpreted as a move that aimed to maintain the UK’s role as an important global 
actor. First Secretary of State, William Hague, had argued in the UN Security Council that all 
nations should make necessary contributions to save innocent Syrian lives (Hague 2013). The 
diaspora clearly interpreted the policy alignment as favorable, deeming it an opportunity to 
obtain the desired policy outcome, namely a UK intervention.38 It thus served as an impetus for 
increased mobilization, both formally and informally.  
However, the policy shift of the UK substantially lowered the chances for diaspora influence. 
While the Government called back Parliament from its break in late August 2013 to secure 
                                                          
37 David Cameron was succeeded by Theresa May in July 2016.  
38 Note that I employ the same definition on intervention as earlier. Intervention thus means imposition of a no-




approval of military action in Syria, its failure to obtain consent revealed a political atmosphere 
clearly in conflict with the diaspora’s desired political goals (referred to as “the Syria vote”). 
Numerous politicians and political observers have considered the vote a huge political fiasco 
for Prime Minister Cameron and the UK more generally (Gaskarth 2016). Also the diaspora 
expressed its frustration by its result and still reflect on its dismal consequences for Syrians who 
three years later continue to suffer (Morris 2016). Similar to the US, the initial policy stance 
seemed to provide an opening for movement influence, considering the relative level of interest 
convergence. The following policy shift in 2013 and Cameron’s decisive acknowledgement and 
adherence to the vote produced an unfavorable and constraining effect on further diaspora 
impact. It is difficult to assess whether the diaspora had any direct influence on individual MPs 
and other members of the Cabinet, but as will be covered below, they seemed to have some 
allies promoting their cause within Parliament. On the matter of engagement, the shifting policy 
alignment became a constraint on movement influence – a constraint the diaspora was unable 
to alter. 
Influential allies 
In comparison to the Syrian-American community, the Syrian diaspora in the UK has had less 
apparent strong allies. As such, this indicator may reflect a stronger constraint and imposed 
limit in this case. That is not to say that allies have not been present at all. Using the same 
delineation as in the US example, allies are those who actively promote the diaspora’s 
pragmatic goals in political processes. 
While several MPs in Parliament have done so, particularly two stand out as significant. 
Significant in that they have actively met with and discussed political processes with the 
diaspora and seem consistent in their policy views on the Syrian crisis. Through the All-Party 
Parliamentary Group, Friends of Syria (APPG), Conservative MP Andrew Mitchell and Labour 
MP Jo Cox have supported no-fly zones and enabling and increasing humanitarian aid to the 
crisis. On the matter of resettling refugees in the UK, only Jo Cox was a solid advocate. It is 
important to note that the APPG has included a number of MPs,39 but as co-chairs of the group, 
these two in particular have been the most visible and outspoken supporters of the political 
goals of the diaspora.   
                                                          
39 It is difficult to pin the exact number of members of the APPG, especially since it was relaunched by MPs 
Mitchell and Cox after the general election in 2015.  
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Andrew Mitchell, serving as Secretary of State for International Development from 2010-2012, 
was a key facilitator of distributing aid to Syrians in refugee camps in countries neighboring 
Syria. Additionally, he maintained after the Syria vote in 2013 that Government should not 
completely wipe intervention off the table. In an interview, he argued that intervention was 
required to alleviate human suffering in Syria. If the motion were to be reintroduced to 
Parliament, he would support it (Hockenberry 2013). In meetings with members of the diaspora, 
he has reinforced and reiterated his call for Britain to pressure for the protection of civilians and 
to strengthen the voice of Syrian-led civil society organizations.   
Jo Cox was arguably the most openly supportive ally of the Syrian diaspora in the UK. Much 
of her respect within the Syrian diaspora stems from her strong commitment to humanitarian 
aid, advocacy for no-fly zones and the acknowledgement of the diaspora’s independent voice. 
As argued by a representative of the RRS, Cox was an “amazing advocate” for Syrians, both in 
the diaspora and at home: “Anything that we needed or wanted, she was willing to raise in 
Parliament, and she took a lot of heat because for her views on Syria […] Sometimes you need 
that voice in Parliament that can push things through” (That’s Manchester 2016). Other groups, 
such as the Syria Solidarity Movement and Syrian Association of Yorkshire, also argued that 
her commitment to humanitarian principles benefited their objectives in Parliament (Safdar 
2016).  
One could argue that Government, by initiating the motion that would open for a humanitarian 
intervention in Syria was an act that supported the political objective of the diaspora. However, 
the fact that they had no particular contact with the diaspora, signifies the absence of an 
allegiance in any direct sense. The reluctance to invite the diaspora to Foreign Affairs 
Committee hearings reflect this (Rethink Rebuild Society 2015a). Furthermore, Prime Minister 
Cameron’s poor agency for the Syria vote in 2013 and decisive call to wipe intervention off the 
table completely in its aftermath (Gaskarth 2016), are supplementary evidence that he and his 
cabinet were not overtly supporting the diaspora.   
Similar to the experience of the Syrian diaspora in the US, the Syrian-British community had 
allies that were important, but not strong enough to alter policies on Syria. They were also few 
in number, making it even more difficult to provide substantial support in political processes. 
Andrew Mitchell was also involved in a political scandal in 2012, forcing him to resign as 
Secretary of State. The loss of an important ministerial position along with an arguably reduced 
credibility further decreased his political influence. Jo Cox was only elected in 2015 and was 




Parliament which can be a factor for reduced political clout.  Her assassination on June 16th 
2016 ended her principled support to the Syrian diaspora and became a major setback to their 
political mobilization. As argued by one representative of the diaspora, “it is difficult to move 
forward without Jo Cox” (That’s Manchester 2016). While the consequences of her death have 
further limited the diaspora’s influence, I argue that despite Cox’s vocal support for the Syrian 
community, she was unable to make any real difference on Britain’s Syria policies.  
Division of elites 
Division of elites have arguably been another constraining factor for the Syrian diaspora in the 
UK, particularly on the matter of intervention. The presumptive idea that division between 
political elites provide a greater chance for movement influence seems refuted, but in 
comparison to the partisan split in the US, my empirical evidence is less conclusive here. 
Division between and among party lines in Parliament has, instead of providing new avenues 
for mobilization and a new set of powerful allies, contributed to further exclusion of the 
diaspora in the political process. It is difficult to assess whether the Syrian crisis is cause of this 
political divide, but the Syria vote in 2013 indicates what some observers have termed “political 
maneuvering” amongst the opposition; using the vote as a tool to gain a political advantage 
(Gaskarth 2016). Labour Party leader, Ed Miliband, seized the opportunity to undermine Prime 
Minister Cameron’s government and, with the support of Conservative backbenchers, managed 
to vote down the motion to intervene in Syria (Strong 2015). 
While it is difficult to pinpoint the role the Syrian diaspora had during these negotiations, the 
division was a contextual element that was effectively closing the door of external diaspora 
influence. Even some Labour MPs expressed discontent with the political procedure and its 
partisan character. It reflected a split, perhaps not as strong as the division in the US Congress 
as elaborated on above, but still a significant one. Despite not being in Parliament at the time, 
MP from 2015, Jo Cox reflected on the Syria vote and contended that “the Labour Party put 
politics above content […] [it] led to the worst possible result, which was taking any action off 
the table forever” (Barnett 2016). It is interesting to note that Ed Miliband and his shadow 
foreign secretary,40 Douglas Alexander, had their own political initiative on Syria, one that 
explicitly sought to consult the UN prior to any further action. While this had been the intention 
                                                          
40 A term used on the opposition’s proposed alternative cabinet minister.  
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of the Conservatives all along, the political dispute that ensued seemed indeed to reflect partisan 
divides based on a pursuit of political gains rather than content.  
Another element that supports this notion is the history of UK foreign policy-making. As argued 
by Gaskarth (2006; 2016), British foreign policy has historically been characterized by 
bipartisanship. Despite differences on domestic policies, both parties have traditionally agreed 
on UK’s response to international developments. As such, Government is expected to consult 
the opposition and then negotiate a compromise. Conservative proponents of intervention such 
as then Defense Secretary, Philip Hammond, argued that by developing an alternative motion 
on Syria, Miliband had “provided succor to the Syrian regime” (Chorley and Duell 2013). It 
displayed disunity in Parliament.  
It can be argued that Labour’s political maneuver was based on other reasons, for example UN 
Secretary General Ban Ki-moon’s plea not to intervene until experts had completed inspections 
of the chemical attacks or based on the lack of public support (as covered below), but it 
nonetheless reinforces the evidence of a partisan split. “A major party opposing the 
government’s policy on a matter of national security was extremely rare […] (Gaskarth 2016). 
If the perspective of Labour as opportunistic on the Syria vote is highlighted, then it can be 
argued that political influence from external interests (such as the diaspora) receives less 
attention and thus does not factor substantially in on policy-decision. Effectively then, it can be 
a partial answer to the diaspora’s recognized dilemma; namely that they are not being listened 
to (Informant 13, 2016). Particularly not on this issue. While I cannot demonstrate any causal 
link between the diaspora and this political process, the indicated constraint has definitely 
produced a more unfavorable context subsequently. It has been harder for the diaspora to 
promote the no-fly zone as a result of the Conservative-Labour divide and its vote in 2013.   
Public opinion 
While I have argue that public opinion has been a constraint for the Syrian diaspora in the UK, 
similar to its US counterpart, empirical evidence suggests a more nuanced picture. By utilizing 
polling data provided by YouGov, it appears that public opinion has, to an extent, fluctuated on 
the matter of intervention. It is particularly interesting to note that the polls, albeit not being 
directly comparable to the American equivalent, have been conducted at roughly the same time 
(2012 and 2013).41 This allows for some form of longitudinal assessment of public opinion in 
relation to the question of humanitarian intervention. Again, it is impossible to gauge direct 
                                                          




support to the diaspora movement. I merely seek to highlight the development of public opinion 
on the question of intervention to illustrate its constraining effects on the diaspora’s influence.  
In 2012, a selection of UK residents were asked whether they would support or oppose 
enforcing a no-fly zone over Syria so the Syrian air force could not attack rebels or civilians. 
This poll (Figure 4) reflected attitudes towards British intervention prior to the chemical 
weapons attack in Ghouta in 2013. The somewhat surprising result shows that 60% of those 
asked were in favor of imposing a no-fly zone and 18% against it at this point. It can indicate 
that the public and the diaspora agreed to a certain extent at this point. One may thus argue that 
the convergence of perspectives between these political forces should have been enough to 
persuade policy-makers to opt for a more assertive approach in Syria. On the other hand, there 
were no sustained public debate on intervention in 2012 and in the absence of a UN mandate, 
it was not actually a tabled political option. Intervention without UN consent would be rendered 
a violation of international law. In context of an inert Security Council and a lukewarm attitude 
towards intervention amongst allied Governments (Adams 2015), supportive public opinion 
and extensive diaspora mobilization was not enough to sway decision-makers and the question 
did not reemerge until later in the conflict and, in particular, after the August 2013 chemical 
weapons attack. 
Figure 4: British attitudes towards enforcing no-fly zones in Syria in 2012 
 








As the question of intervention entered the political agenda in late August, YouGov conducted 
another poll (Figure 5). At the time, the media had reported a number of chlorine gas attacks in 
Eastern Ghouta (a suburb of Damascus) which demanded some form of response from western 
governments. Those surveyed were asked whether they would support using British aircraft and 
missiles to enforce a no-fly zone over Syria, and if necessary, use them against aircraft and 
airports operated by the Assad regime. Conducted four days before the question of intervention 
were to be debated in Parliament, the public reflected a different attitude compared to what it 
did in early 2012. 42% opposed intervention whereas 34% supported it. While I do not aim to 
explain the reason for the shift in public opinion, one can argue that it imposed a constraint on 
the diaspora’s prospects for impact. Some observers viewed Cameron’s decision to wipe the 
possibility of intervention completely off the table as evidence of acknowledgement of public 
opinion on the matter (Hannan 2013). It was a reaffirmation of democratic values in British 
policy-making (Gaskarth 2016). The timing of the shift in public opinion was at least 
particularly bad for the diaspora as what they had long called for was about to be seriously 
debated on a political level. That they did not have public opinion as support at this critical 
moment, constrained their ability to influence policy-makers.     
Figure 5: British attitudes towards enforcing no-fly zones in Syria in 2013 
 
Source: YouGov (2013) 
It is important to emphasize that comparing the public opinion polls both within and between 










intervention has been posed differently. Moreover, both the political motion in the US and the 
UK have not detailed intervention explicitly, making it rather vague whether it entailed military 
forces on Syrian soil (similar to Iraq in 2003) or establishing a hegemony in Syrian airspaces 
(similar to Libya in 2011). Despite this, I argue that the surveys do have some empirical value 
in that they can be interpreted as proxies for the attitudes towards a humanitarian intervention. 
By assuming that intervention conforms to the diaspora’s call for no-fly zones it can be argued 
that public opinion was a political constraint on the diaspora’s political mobilization, lowering 
its potential influence.  
In sum, this section on political context in the UK indicates how external factors provided the 
Syrian diaspora with both opportunities and constraints. In comparison to the political context 
in the US, my discussion above shows how these indicators reflect similar tendencies. 
Contextual factors that limit the diaspora’s ability to influence host state policies in the US and 
the UK includes shifting policy alignment, insufficiently influential allies, divided elites and 
unfavorable public opinion. At the end of this chapter, I summarize these findings in a model 
(Figure 6). I now turn to the last element of this analysis, framing the political discourse.  
5.5 External explanations – Framing the political 
 discourse 
The purpose of this section is twofold. Firstly, I intend to explain why the diaspora’s framing 
processes have failed to capture the political discourse and consequently been unable to garner 
widespread attention and support. Secondly, the goal is to demonstrate how discursive 
opportunity, understood as ideas that are rendered sensible, realistic and legitimate within a 
certain polity at a specific time, can be an analytical construct that help explain the movements’ 
inability to influence policies. This section draws together both cases as I see the prevailing 
political discourse and the challenges and shortcomings of both diaspora communities to be 
similar. It uses the following theoretical proposition as guidance: 
External factors, specifically discursive opportunities, explain why the Syrian diaspora in the 





5.5.1 The dominant foreign policy discourse of non-intervention 
It should be noted that the political mobilization of the Syrian diaspora in the US and the UK 
have faced a similar challenging element – namely the pursuit of civilian protection in context 
of a discourse dominated by a reluctance to overextend foreign policy measures in the Middle 
East. While civilian protection has been called for since day one (Informant 9, 2015), the 
diaspora has not able to alter the political discourse despite framing it through a notion of 
humanitarian responsibility. Host state concerns of past strains have trumped the diaspora’s call 
to alleviate human suffering. 
President Obama’s foreign policy conviction reflected an approach that sought to reduce the 
US’ military engagements abroad, particularly emphasizing aspirations of demobilizing war 
efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. An effective summary of Obama’s perspective of foreign affairs 
thus had a reference to past interventions: “no system of government can or should be imposed 
upon one nation by any other” (Gerges 2012, 93). Indeed, the dominant foreign policy discourse 
was one of non-intervention in the US. In a similar fashion, Prime Minister Cameron looked to 
recent British foreign policy failures for inspiration and sought to mold his own approach 
around a discourse of non-intervention (Daddow and Schnapper 2013). The appointment of 
William Hague as First Secretary of State served as a step towards a more cautious foreign 
policy for the UK.  
Although they intended to frame it in terms of protecting civilians, any engagement in Syria 
was, by the political establishment in the US and the UK (majority of parliament), rendered an 
overextension of foreign policy, one that would reflect the assertive doctrine pursued less than 
a decade earlier prior to the Iraq intervention. While the calls for civilian protection did not 
directly imply that the diasporas sought a large scale invasion of Syria, it was indeed too similar 
and thus unconvincing. An informant from the Syrian diaspora in the US reflected on the 
question of intervention and argued that the diaspora was unable to accurately frame 
intervention in humanitarian terms because the Obama-administration had, early on, labeled 
intervention in solid military terms. “We didn’t ask for your tanks in our streets. We wanted 
more pressure from day one, that civilians could not be bombed […] What people ask for is 
more protection from the Air Forces of the regime. We need civilian protection” (Informant 2, 
2015). One can thus argue that while some may claim the diaspora’s objective as legitimate 
based on its humanitarian notions, it was insufficient to convince policy-makers in either 
country to accept them against the backdrop of a non-interventionist foreign policy discourse. 




sensible, realistic and legitimate at the time arguably because of the strong parallels to previous 
engagements.  
One may argue that the Libya-intervention was a diversion that challenges my argument of a 
dominating non-interventionist foreign policy discourse. However, it is important to emphasize 
that Syria and Libya were two completely different cases. The Libyan diaspora, for example, 
operated in a different political environment. In fact, it has been argued that the intervention in 
Libya was a verification of Western overextension in Middle Eastern conflicts and thus was the 
final straw confirming both Obama’s and Cameron’s philosophy (Naím 2011; Goldberg 2016).  
5.5.2  Symptom vs. root cause  
Another challenge for the Syrian diaspora has been to convince, not only policy-makers, but 
also the general public, of the root cause of the conflict. The diaspora has maintained since the 
inception of the Syrian uprising that solving the crisis requires focus on what they argue is “a 
brutal dictatorship that crushed a non-violent uprising” (Informant 13, 2016). The diaspora has 
argued extensively that the refugee crisis is at its root caused by Syrian Air Force bombing of 
neighborhoods held by rebel groups. Thus, increasing provisions to refugee camps in countries 
neighboring Syria is treating the symptom rather than the root cause (Rethink Rebuild Society 
2015c). Furthermore, diaspora organizations have promoted the claim that the Assad-regime 
was instrumental in producing Daesh and other extremist groups, arguing that at the beginning 
of the conflict, known militant Islamists were strategically released in order to militarize the 
conflict (Rethink Rebuild Society 2015b). Targeting Daesh through airstrikes is, similar to 
extending and increasing help to refugee camps, first and foremost a treatment of a symptom.  
As such, part of the diaspora’s inability to influence policy-making in both cases stems from 
the difficulty of correcting the dominant narrative that, in their view, does not separate cause 
and effect. This is particularly accurate after the growth of the refugee-crisis and the emergence 
of more radical expressions in the conflict, most notably illustrated by the development of 
Jabhat al-Nusra in 2012 and Daesh in 2014. It can be argued that these elements have 
overshadowed the diaspora’s attempts of framing the narrative because they have produced 
other concerns for the host states. The prominence of national security and Daesh in political 
discourse is indicative of this. Additionally, I would argue that the growing importance of 
awareness-making by the diaspora, as argued by some informants, are additional, supportive 
evidence (Informant 1, 2015; Informant 13, 2016). However, in the early phases of the uprising, 
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framing of the conflict’s main cause seemed less of a source of dispute. Both President Obama 
and Prime Minister Cameron condemned the Assad regime’s retaliation against the street 
protests in 2011. Arguably, the political discourse regarding cause and effect has become a 
growing issue for the diaspora as the conflict has progressed.  
Despite providing convincing evidence of their claims, the diaspora has been unable to alter the 
dominant discursive narrative. While the reflections above are not necessarily rendered 
insensible, unrealistic and illegitimate, it can be argued that the Syrian diaspora has been unable 
to outbid concerns that translate directly into host countries’ immediate interests. National 
security in the wake of the Paris and San Bernardino attacks, for example, have emerged as a 
strong competitive discourse challenging diaspora’s narrative and political objectives. It has 
produced greater resentment of Syrian refugees and Muslims writ-large in both the US and UK 
and intensified the focus on combating terror by targeting Daesh in Syria.  
In conclusion, the discursive frames of the conflict have constrained the Syrian diaspora’s 
ability to affect host state policies. A dominant non-intervention foreign policy discourse has 
reduced the resonance of the Syrian diasporas call to protect civilians. It was perceived as an 
overextension of foreign policy to intervene in Syria. Furthermore, the fear of terrorism 
emerging as a result of the conflict and questions of national security have overshadowed what 
the diaspora argues is the root cause of the conflict. They have been unable to correct this 
narrative, reducing their chance of influencing policy in either host country. 
External factors explaining the lack of influence of the Syrian diaspora 
Below is a model (Figure 6) showing the constraining effect of external factors as I have 
discussed above. It includes both national political context and discursive frames. Shifting 
policy alignment, division of elites, insufficiently influential allies, unfavorable public opinion 
and the inability to capture the discursive frames all limited the Syrian diaspora’s ability to 






Figure 6: Constraining external factors 
 
 
One could argue that this model alone represents an extensive narrative of the Syrian diaspora’s 
lack of influence. Following most-different-systems design as a comparative strategy, one could 
argue that these factors, because they are similar in both cases, explain why the diaspora were 
unable to impact host state policies. Since internal factors reflect different trajectories, this set 
of explanations would be disregarded. However, as I have shown through the empirical 
analysis, that would be to ignore the vast complexity of internal struggles and how this have 
had its influence on the diaspora’s mobilization. It is the intersection of internal and external 
factors that ultimately explains why the Syrian diaspora fails to influence host state policies, 
not external factors alone. It is thus imperative that we continue performing in-depth case 
studies of mobilization and impact. As I have demonstrated, using a paired comparison 




































6  Conclusion 
By utilizing the strategy of paired comparison and gathering extensive primary and secondary 
data material, this thesis has analyzed the Syrian diaspora in two particular host countries with 
respect to political mobilization and policy impact. More specifically, I have been interested in 
uncovering the factors and conditions that have limited Syrians’ ability to influence host state 
policies in the United States and the United Kingdom. This in light of a substantial – and still 
growing – body of research that has focused predominantly on the influence diasporas have on 
host state policy making. By using social movement impact theory as an analytical framework 
for scrutinizing the diaspora’s political failures, I posed the following research question at the 
outset:  
Why has the Syrian diaspora failed to influence host state policies in the United States and the 
United Kingdom? 
As the analysis indicates, the Syrian diaspora’s lack of political influence does not allow for a 
simple and parsimonious answer. Indeed, the two cases reflect a complex and composite picture 
of political mobilization where both internal and external factors combined explain the 
outcome. The propositions suggested in the theory chapter are thus not mutually exclusive. 
While the literature has long been in disagreement on whether internal or external explanations 
best account for movement impact (Giugni, McAdam, and Tilly 1999; Amenta et al. 2010), my 
findings suggest that there is no “magic bullet” determining movement outcomes. It is the 
intersection of internal and external (contextual and discursive) factors that explain why the 
Syrian diaspora has failed to influence host state policies. That said, the empirical analysis does 
not allow me to decisively conclude on which set of explanations matter most.  
As demonstrated, the movements share one central historical element, the lack of civil society 
experience. The combination of repression at home and abroad, with the neglect of ethnic, 
religious and regional diversion in education have fostered a sense of distrust in the Syrian 
expatriate communities. As such, there has been a reluctance to mobilize politically, especially 
based on a Syrian identity before the uprising. While the uprising has arguably spurred 
mobilization in the diaspora, low trust levels have endured, particularly in the Syrian-American 
community. In the Syrian-British diaspora, this difference has, to some extent, been 
acknowledged, hence why some diaspora organizations have allocated more resource to 
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accommodate this element. In Britain, this seems to have come at the expense of political 
mobilization.  
Despite this shared element, the movements have, in terms of mobilization structures, had two 
different trajectories, but with a similar negative outcome. The Syrian-American diaspora had 
difficulties garnering widespread support within the Syrian community, much due to 
conservative connections and regime ties of the diaspora’s “early risers”, but also because of 
the personal agendas and rivalry that emerged. It subsequently led to a manifestation of deep-
rooted cleavages in the diaspora, producing highly uncoordinated and fractionalized 
professional advocacy organizations. These organizations have struggled to obtain legitimacy 
in the eye of American policy-makers, as they do not know which voice to listen to. As such, 
these internal factors have reduced the diaspora’s chances of affecting policies.  
In the Syrian-British diaspora, limited funding for political mobilization and the diaspora’s 
limited size have been an important constraining element. Combined with its focus on 
community reconstruction, the political expression has largely been less professionalized and 
more based on individual activism. It has been unable to establish an effective political lobby 
in London. Despite being able to coordinate better than its Syrian-American counterpart, it’s 
weak lobby has constrained the diaspora’s ability to influence host state policies. 
When it comes to external explanations, both cases reflect similar opportunities and similar 
constraints. Access to the political systems have been present in the US and the UK allowing 
them to protest at public venues as well as interact with a variety of stakeholders in respective 
polities. Furthermore, a shifting policy alignment, allies without sufficient influence, divided 
elites, and a public opinion that was largely unfavorable, reflect contextual constraints both 
diasporas have faced.  
Lastly, the dominant discourse of non-intervention combined with the rise of terrorist 
organizations have made the Syrian diaspora’s call for increased US and UK involvement 
largely unresonant. They have been unable to frame what they argue is the root cause of the 
problem, much due to the dominance of the alternative discourse. It has thus constrained their 






6.1 Implications, limits and further research 
There are several implications of this study. Firstly, I have illustrated the utility of employing 
social movement impact theory in the assessment of diaspora politics – particularly the aspect 
that concerns the diaspora’s ability to affect host state policies. Whether they succeed or fail, 
this analytical framework can be employed on other cases of diaspora mobilization. As diaspora 
politics grows in importance (Vertovec 2005; Adamson 2016), this thesis presents an innovative 
and original way to go about it.  
Secondly, I have demonstrated that it is crucial that we also pay attention to the lack of impact 
when we study social movements. The social movement literature has focused extensively on 
positive cases, but little on negative cases. Effectively, this thesis shows that the study of 
negative cases are indeed useful for theory development (Goertz 2005, 159). Despite its 
challenges, by studying failure, we may better understand the linkages between movements and 
their consequences (Giugni 1999). This aspect thus deserves more attention from social 
movement scholars who have largely neglected it. Furthermore, we should combine internal 
factors with external factors to produce a more holistic understanding of mobilization and its 
consequences. Not doing so may lead to the attribution of wrongful causal relationships and 
spurious conclusions. In this thesis, ignoring either of these groups of explanations would have 
missed crucial aspects of the Syrian diaspora’s failure to influence host state policies. The share 
of explanations that altogether tells the story of the Syrian diaspora are indeed vast. There is no 
reason to expect this to be different for other cases of mobilization, be they successful or failed. 
Arguably, this indicates that we should pay attention to both internal and external aspects when 
studying social movement outcomes in general.  
The thesis is not without its limits. One important limitation is the question of causality. 
Movement impact research is particularly vulnerable when assessing causal relationships. As I 
argued in the methods chapter, the narrative provided in this thesis propose theoretical 
explanations for the lack of movement impact. It is therefore important to take it for what it is. 
The use of different sources of data and the temporal manner of how mobilization was analysed 
helps alleviate some of these difficulties. However, certainty of causality remains a caveat of 
the thesis.  
While the study has been extensive in its own right by covering both internal and external 
elements affecting the diaspora’s prospects for influence, it is by no means exhaustive. By that 
I mean that several choices have been made in the research process that have ultimately led to 
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the exclusion of certain interesting research avenues. I will here synthesize those avenues I 
deem to have largest potential in terms of both theoretical and empirical usefulness.  
First, I have focused on diaspora mobilization exclusively within national political contexts. 
This has come at the expense of a wider international context. For example, I have not paid 
extensive attention to the proxy elements of the Syrian conflict, looking at how such elements 
may have limited the diaspora’s ability to influence respective host states. As argued by one 
scholar “the modern nation-state is not a discrete ecological unit insulated from exogenous 
pressures” (Meyer 2003). There is thus reason to believe that by extending the range of variables 
to cover these aspects, we could learn more about how other state actors inhibit movement 
influence. One way this can be done is by incorporating international relations in assessments 
of political opportunity.  
Second, this thesis has focused primarily on political impact. Further studies could extend the 
perspective of impact by looking at how the diaspora has strived to influence perceptions of the 
Syrian conflict. As alluded to above, there are also consequences of no impact. An avenue could 
be to focus more attention on what happens to movements, and perhaps in particular, with 
diaspora communities when they are unsuccessful in changing policies.  
Third, employing social network theory or interest group theory on a similar set of cases could 
be promising. While social movement theory has its usefulness as demonstrated, the findings 
can and should be corroborated by further studies using other analytical frameworks. 
In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that the Syrian conflict still rages on. What can we 
expect to see in the near future? The question many Syrians ask these days is if their homeland 
is a lost cause. Reduced funding for political activities and a stronger focus on the humanitarian 
burden seems to be the trend in both the United States and the United Kingdom. While there 
still is extensive political mobilization, it seems to be dwindling. Syrians in the diaspora are still 
committed, but the increasing financial burden to alleviate human suffering and a tiredness of 
the conflict may reduce the motivation and ability to mobilize politically in the near future. 
Furthermore, Russia, Iran and Hezbollah’s involvement in the conflict presents a strong 
challenge for host states to implement some of the policies mobilized for in the diaspora (most 
notably humanitarian intervention and no-fly zones). Maybe the “window of opportunity” in 
terms of influence on this matter is now closed. With Donald Trump’s ascension to the 
presidency in January 2017, it is expected that he will reconfigure Washington, D.C.’s policies, 
both domestic and foreign. As such, a new policy towards the Syrian conflict and new ways to 




and new opportunities. While there is little difference to spot in UK policies after Theresa May 
succeeded David Cameron, it will be interesting to see how foreign relations will develop 
between the two host states and if it will have an impact on the Syrian conflict. What it means 
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Appendix 1: Public opinion polls with question and alternatives 
Public opinion poll Poll question Alternatives 
Pew Research (2012) Do you think the United States has a 
responsibility to do something about 
the fighting in Syria between 
government forces and anti-
government groups, or doesn’t the 
United States have this responsibility? 
• US has responsibility 
• US doesn’t have 
responsibility 
• Don’t know 
 
Pew Research (2013) Would you favor or oppose the U.S. 
conducting military airstrikes against 
Syria in response to reports that the 




• Don’t know 
 
YouGov (2012) Enforcing a no-fly zone over Syria so 
the Syrian air force cannot attack 
rebels or civilians 
• Support 
• Oppose 
• Don’t know 
 
YouGov (2013)  Using British aircraft and missiles to 
enforce a no-fly zone over Syria and, if 
necessary, use them against aircraft 




• Don’t know 
 
 
